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The structure of global intellectual property law as incorporated in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is implicated in 
the current lack of COVID-19 vaccines, medical equipment, medicines and diagnostics needed to 
combat the pandemic. In this paper, we elucidate the legal issues surrounding the ‘TRIPS waiver’ 
proposal initially put forward by India and South Africa in October 2020, which, as of June 2021, is 
supported by more than 60 states. We analyse the different intellectual property rights relevant to the 
proposal – focusing primarily on patent rights and trade secrets – which are most relevant to the present 
COVID-19 vaccine context. We explain why the existing TRIPS flexibilities around compulsory 
licensing are incapable of addressing the present pandemic context adequately, in terms of both 
procedure and legal substance. Given the ongoing absence of sufficient engagement by the 
pharmaceutical industry with proposed global mechanisms to share intellectual property rights, data and 
know-how to address the pandemic, we argue that both incentives and mandatory mechanisms are 
needed.  
We make two arguments to this effect: first, the TRIPS waiver is a necessary and proportionate 
legal measure for clearing intellectual property (IP) barriers in a direct, consistent and efficient fashion, 
enabling the freedom to operate for more companies to produce COVID-19 vaccines and other health 
technologies without the fear of infringing another party’s IP rights and the attendant threat of litigation; 
and second, the TRIPS waiver acts as an important political, moral and economic lever towards 
encouraging solutions aimed at global equitable access to vaccines, which is in the wider interest of the 
global public. The TRIPS waiver is an essential legal instrument in this context for enabling a radical 
increase in manufacturing capacity, and hence supply, of COVID-19 vaccines, creating a pathway to 
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The structure of global intellectual property law as incorporated in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) is implicated in the current lack of COVID-191 vaccines, medical equipment, 
medicines and diagnostics (hereafter, ‘health technologies’), which are needed to combat 
the pandemic.2 Although equitable access to vaccines is in the moral, political and 
economic interests of the global public and requires global solidarity,3 the phenomenon of 
COVID-19 ‘vaccine nationalism’ has brought into sharp relief the misalignment of current 
legal and financial incentives to produce and distribute vaccines equitably.4 The crisis 
further demonstrates the failure of high-income countries (HICs) to realise the promise 
they made at the time of the TRIPS negotiations in 1994, that by agreeing to the terms of 
TRIPS, lower and middle-income countries (LMICs) would benefit from technology 
transfer and the building of productive capacity.5 As such, the current crisis is revealing 
not only of inadequacies of how to deal with global emergencies, but also of deficiencies 
within the international ‘patent bargain’ itself.6  
This paper elucidates the legal issues surrounding the ‘TRIPS waiver’ proposal initially 
put forward by India and South Africa in October 2020,7 which, as of May 2021, is 
supported by more than 60 states,8 and has received statements of support from the World 
Health Organization (WHO).9 We analyse the different intellectual property rights relevant 
 
1 Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) hereafter ‘COVID-19’. 
2 This article focuses primarily on vaccines – which should not be taken as downplaying the importance of the 
various other health technologies whose diffusion is also crucially important in combatting Covid-19. See 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) (1994). 
3 S Thambisetty, ‘Vaccines and Patents: How Self-Interest and Artificial Scarcity Weaken Human Solidarity’ LSE 
Covid-19 blog (March 2021) https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2021/02/11/vaccines-and-patents-how-self-
interest-and-artificial-scarcity-weaken-human-solidarity/ 
4 HY Kang, ‘Patent Capital in the Covid-19 Pandemic’ Critical Legal Thinking blog (March 2021) 
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2021/02/09/patent-capital-in-the-covid-19-pandemic-critical-intellectual-
property-law/  
5 A Orford, ‘Broken Bargains’ LRB Blog (May 2021) https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2021/may/broken-bargains  
6 KC Shadlen, S Guennif, A Guzmán and N Lalitha (Eds.), Intellectual Property, Pharmaceuticals and Public Health: Access 
to Drugs in Developing Countries (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
7 Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of 
Covid-19. Communication from India and South Africa (2 Oct 2020) IP/C/W/669 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True (accessed 
24th May 2021). See also revised TRIPS waiver text of 21 May 2021 https://www.keionline.org/wp-
content/uploads/W669Rev1.pdf 
8 There are currently moves in Europe considering whether the EU would also support the waiver proposal; on 20 
May, in a non-binding vote, the European Parliament voted in favour of a proposal for the EU to support the 
waiver https://twitter.com/amnesty/status/1395341916053639168?s=20 European Parliament, ‘Covid-19 
Vaccines: MEPs clash on proposed waiver of patents’ (19 May 2021) 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20210512STO04016/covid-19-vaccines-meps-
clash-on-proposed-waiver-of-patents; a result on this is expected to be put to a vote in the EU Commission 7–
10 June meeting https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/agenda/briefing/2021-05-17/0/parliament-to-
discuss-call-for-waiver-of-covid-19-vaccine-patents  
9 World Health Organization (WHO), ‘WHO Director-General Commends United States Decision to Support 
Temporary Waiver on Intellectual Property Rights for Covid-19 Vaccines’ (5 May 2021) 
https://www.who.int/news/item/05-05-2021-who-director-general-commends-united-states-decision-to-
support-temporary-waiver-on-intellectual-property-rights-for-covid-19-vaccines   
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to the proposal – focusing primarily on patent rights and trade secrets – which are most 
relevant to the present COVID-19 vaccine context. We explain why the existing TRIPS 
flexibilities around compulsory licensing are incapable of addressing the present pandemic 
context adequately, in terms of both procedure and legal substance.10  
The extent of the current health crisis posed by COVID-19 is as undeniable as the 
current global response is untenable. Given the ongoing absence of sufficient engagement 
by the pharmaceutical industry with proposed global mechanisms to share intellectual 
property rights, data and know-how to address the pandemic, we argue that mandatory 
mechanisms are needed.11 The TRIPS waiver is an essential legal instrument in this context 
for enabling a radical increase in manufacturing capacity, and hence supply, of COVID-
19 vaccines, creating a pathway to achieve global equitable access.12 
We make two arguments to this effect: first, the TRIPS waiver is a necessary and 
proportionate legal measure for clearing intellectual property (IP) barriers in a direct, 
consistent and efficient fashion, enabling the freedom to operate for more companies to 
produce COVID-19 vaccines and other health technologies without the fear of infringing 
another party’s IP rights and the attendant threat of litigation; and second, the TRIPS 
waiver acts as an important political, moral and economic lever towards encouraging 
solutions aimed at global equitable access to vaccines, which is in the wider interest of the 
global public.  
It is not too late for these global solutions to be reached via voluntary agreements 
between states, the WHO, the WTO and pharmaceutical companies – whereby such 
companies could voluntarily agree to share IP, data and know-how and to transfer 
technology to enable a radical increase of manufacturing capacity for COVID-19 vaccines 
across the world. The WHO’s Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response recently recommended that the WTO and WHO convene a meeting of vaccine-
producing countries and manufacturers to gain agreement on technology transfer and 
voluntary licensing arrangements for COVID-19 vaccines; and, that in the absence of such 
agreement within three months, the proposed TRIPS waiver should come into effect 
immediately.13 The waiver proposal, and the mounting support it is getting from civil 
society, notable public figures, and many countries, could indeed act as a strong lever to 
encourage greater co-operation by industry with such voluntary proposals.14 Nonetheless, 
 
10 S Ragavan and A Vanni (Eds.), Intellectual Property Law and Access to Medicine: TRIPS Agreement, Health, and 
Pharmaceuticals (Routledge, 2021). See also O Aginam, J Harrington and PK Yu (Eds.), The Global Governance of 
HIV/AIDS: Intellectual Property and Access to Essential Medicines (Edward Elgar, 2013). 
11 Examples of these discussed below include the World Health Organization’s proposed Covid-19 Technology 
Access Pool (C-TAP), which has attracted very limited industry engagement to date. See details at 
https://www.who.int/initiatives/covid-19-technology-access-pool  
12 M Mazzucato, J Ghosh and E Torreele, ‘To control the pandemic, it is essential to suspend intellectual property 
rights on medical products related to covid-19’ The Economist (20 April 2021) https://www.economist.com/by-
invitation/2021/04/20/mariana-mazzucato-jayati-ghosh-and-els-torreele-on-waiving-covid-patents  
13 The Independent Panel, ‘COVID-19: Make it the Last Pandemic’ (May 2021) 
https://theindependentpanel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/COVID-19-Make-it-the-Last-
Pandemic_final.pdf at 14. 
14 UNAIDS, ‘Former heads of state and Nobel laureates call on President Biden to waive intellectual property rules 
for COVID vaccines’ (14 April 2021)  
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in the absence of sufficient co-operation at present, and as we continue to see a lack of 
adequate engagement by industry to enable the radical scale-up of manufacturing that is 
needed for COVID-19 vaccines, mandatory solutions must be advanced, and the waiver 
is a key part of this. 
In making these arguments, we acknowledge and explain that the TRIPS waiver 
proposal is not a panacea for all the ills of global vaccine inequity. Nonetheless, we argue 
that in the current context the TRIPS waiver is a fundamental ingredient for facilitating 
global equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, which is vital for bringing the pandemic to 
an end.  
To argue against the TRIPS waiver at this time is to give tacit backing to the status 
quo, a system that is currently failing LMIC populations and is projected to continue failing 
them in the coming years.15 Since the present legal order, and the incentives embedded 
within it, support a system that prioritises vaccinating populations in HICs, it is only by 
fundamentally changing course that we can hope to have a realistic chance to make 
vaccines accessible to the entire global public in the short-term.16 In the medium to long 
term, the discussion generated by the TRIPS waiver has the potential to act as a catalyst 
towards a structural rebalancing of monopoly market power for pandemic situations and 




INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, COVID-19 AND GLOBAL 
VACCINE INEQUITY 
 
The case for making systemic changes to how intellectual property law incentivises health 
technologies is not new. The 2016 United Nations Secretary-General’s report on access to 
medicines recognised disjunctures in law, policy and practice in relation to the right to 
health17 and international trade, especially with regard to conflicts between intellectual 
property rules and public health objectives.18 The COVID-19 pandemic has electrified this 




15 ‘Editorial: The World Needs Many More Coronavirus Vaccines’ The New York Times (24 April 2021)  
https://t.co/oKu2bNGU5H?amp=1. See also ‘Vaccine Nationalism means that poor countries will be left 
behind’ The Economist (January 2021) https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/01/28/vaccine-
nationalism-means-that-poor-countries-will-be-left-behind.  
16 A Irwin, ‘How Covid Spurred Africa to plot a Vaccines Revolution’ Nature (21 April 2021) 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01048-1  
17 The right to health is enshrined in several international legal instruments, see in particular: Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 25 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Article 12. See also D Matthews, ‘The Right to Health and Patents’ in C Geiger (Ed.), Research Handbook on Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2015) 496–512. 
18 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines: Promoting 
innovation and access to health technologies (September 2016) http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/  
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the open the problematic relationship between intellectual property law and global 
health.19 
The pandemic has exacerbated existing global inequalities, none more apparent than 
in the case of vaccine production and distribution. As of 14 May 2021, the US and UK 
have vaccinated around half of their adult populations against COVID-19 with at least one 
vaccine dose.20 Israel has already exceeded this, vaccinating 63% of its citizens with one 
dose.21 EU countries are catching up: the culminative uptake of one vaccine dose for adults 
over 18 in EU/EEA countries is currently 36%.22 However, billions in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America remain unvaccinated, and crucially, many people in such countries have no 
hope of receiving a COVID-19 vaccine in 2021, 2022 or even 2023.23 At the time of 
writing, it is reported that just 1.39% of the total population in Africa, and 10.53% in India, 
have received at least one vaccine dose.24 Indeed, recent data highlights that ‘only 0.3 
percent of the vaccines administered globally have been given in the 29 poorest countries 
where 9 percent of the world’s population lives’.25 It was predicted in late 2020 that 90% 
of those living in 67 low income countries would not obtain access to COVID-19 vaccines 
 
19 For a recent statement on the role of business entities to facilitate the right to health (and not to enforce IP in a 
manner inconsistent with this in the vaccine context) see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Statement on universal affordable vaccination for COVID-19, international cooperation and intellectual property 
E/C.12/2021/1. See also G Dutfield, That High Design of Purest Gold: A Critical History of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
1880-2020 (World Scientific Publishing, 2020); EFM ’t Hoen, The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly Power: 
Drug Patents, Access, Innovation and the Application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (AMB 
Publishing, 2009); SF Halabi, Intellectual Property and the New International Economic Order: Oligopoly, Regulation, and 
Wealth Redistribution in the Global Knowledge Economy (chapter 6 on ‘Access to medicines and vaccines’) (Cambridge 
University Press, 2018); G Krikorian and A Kapczynski (Eds.), Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property 
(Zone Press, 2010); S Ragavan and A Vanni (Eds.), Intellectual Property Law and Access to Medicine: TRIPS Agreement, 
Health, and Pharmaceuticals (Routledge, 2021). 
20 On 14 May 2021, the US had vaccinated 46% of its adult population with one dose, while the UK had vaccinated 
54% of its population with one dose https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations  
21 See details at https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations – figure reported 14 May 2021. 
22 Figure reported on 17 May 2021 at https://vaccinetracker.ecdc.europa.eu/public/extensions/COVID-
19/vaccine-tracker.html#uptake-tab  
23 ‘Vaccine Nationalism means that poor countries will be left behind’ The Economist (January 2021) 
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/01/28/vaccine-nationalism-means-that-poor-countries-will-
be-left-behind  
24 These figures were reported on 19 May 2021 and represent the: ‘Share of the total population that received at 
least one vaccine dose. This may not equal the share that are fully vaccinated if the vaccine requires two doses.’ 
See details at https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations  
25 EFM ’t Hoen, ‘Covid shows the world it needs new rules to deal with pandemics’ Medicines Law and Policy (21 May 
2021) https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2021/05/covid-shows-the-world-it-needs-new-rules-to-deal-with-
pandemics/. See also J Holder, ‘Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World’ The New York Times (21 
May 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-
tracker.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article. See also B Mueller, ‘While rich countries 
come back to life, the virus is ravaging poorer nations’ The New York Times (5 May 2021) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/05/world/while-rich-countries-come-back-to-life-the-virus-is-ravaging-
poorer-nations.html  
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in 2021;26 yet, with the ongoing substantial under-delivery of promised vaccines,27 and 
problems with supply chains, it is likely that even this is an overestimate.28  
Against the backdrop of emerging vaccine inequity, WHO Director-General Dr 
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, speaking in January 2021, lamented that: ‘… the world is 
on the brink of a catastrophic moral failure – and the price of this failure will be paid with 
lives and livelihoods in the world’s poorest countries’.29 Although the WHO guidelines 
recommend that health workers and high-risk people in all nations should get vaccinated 
first,30 HICs, including the US, UK and EU states, have not followed through, instead 
prioritising their own populations.31  
Aside from the moral failure this inequity is creating, there is also the pragmatic reality: 
we need global equitable access to vaccines to bring COVID-19 under control. Without a 
significant and rapid increase of vaccine production and equitable global distribution, new 
variants of the virus will likely continue to emerge.32 Although there is, as yet, no scientific 
consensus on the effect on vaccine efficacy of new variants,33 it is thought that such 
variants may render existing vaccines less effective, or ineffective, so that it may be 
necessary to modify vaccines to work against new variant strains.34 In effect, ‘[v]accine 
nationalism is not just morally indefensible. It is epidemiologically self-defeating and 
 
26 Oxfam, ‘Campaigners warn that 9 out of 10 people in poor countries are set to miss out on covid-19 vaccine 
next year’ (9 Dec 2020) https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/campaigners-warn-9-out-10-people-poor-
countries-are-set-miss-out-covid-19-vaccine; O Dyer, ‘Covid-19: Many poor countries will see almost no vaccine 
next year, aid groups warn’ 371 BMJ (2020) – doi:10.1136/bmj.m4809; See also A Karan and T Pogge, ‘Solving 
global vaccine inequity requires new incentives for pharmaceutical companies’ BMJ Blog (2 April 2021) 
https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2021/04/02/solving-global-vaccine-inequity-requires-new-incentives-for-
pharmaceutical-companies/  
27 Z Rizvi, ‘Not Enough: Six Reasons Why COVID-19 Vaccine Manufacturing Must be Rapidly Scaled-Up’ Public 
Citizen (13 May 2021) https://www.citizen.org/article/not-enough-six-reasons-why-covid-19-vaccine-
manufacturing-must-be-rapidly-scaled-up/#_ftn3  
28 ‘India’s Serum Institute to start export of COVID-19 vaccine by year-end’ Reuters (18 May 2021) 
https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-serum-institute-start-export-covid-19-vaccine-by-year-end-2021-
05-18/  
29 WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at 148th session of the Executive Board (18 January 2021) 
https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-148th-
session-of-the-executive-board  
30 WHO, ‘Roadmap for Prioritizing Population Groups for Vaccines Against Covid-19’ (27 September 2020) 
https://www.who.int/immunization/sage/meetings/2020/october/Session03_Roadmap_Prioritization_Covid
-19_vaccine.pdf  
31 G Yamey, ‘Could an act of global solidarity persuade rich nations that vaccine nationalism is misguided’ (7 Dec 
2020) https://covid19healthdiaries.com/diary?did=397  
32 Wouters et al. remark: ‘More equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines would help contain the pandemic 
sooner, and thus minimise the risk of new variants of the virus arising, against which existing vaccines might be 
less effective.’ OJ Wouters, KC Shadlen, M Salcher-Konrad, AJ Pollard, HJ Larson, Y Teerawattananon and M 
Jit, ‘Challenges in ensuring global access to COVID-19 vaccines: production, affordability, allocation, and 
deployment’ 397 Lancet (2021) https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)00306-
8/fulltext. See also Irish Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Report on the Distribution of COVID-
19 Vaccines to Developing Countries (March 2021) 
https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/committee/dail/33/joint_committee_on_foreign_affairs_and_defence
/reports/2021/2021-03-05_report-on-the-distribution-of-covid-19-vaccines-to-developing-countries_en.pdf.  
33 ‘Top Scientists Question the Need for Covid-19 Booster Shots’ Reuters (13 May 2021) 
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/top-scientists-question-need-covid-19-booster-shots-2021-05-
13/  
34 N Triggle, ‘Covid: Scientists developing vaccine boosters to tackle variants’ BBC (8 Feb 2021) 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-55976037  
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clinically counterproductive’.35 The lack of vaccine access in any one state, or group of 
states, threatens the control of COVID-19 everywhere (a point we return to below).  
At present, limited production is creating problems of scarcity and unequal supply.36 
This is despite some voluntary co-operation by industry, whereby some pharmaceutical 
companies are working together to boost production. For example, there is an agreement 
between Johnson & Johnson (J&J) and Merck to boost US production of the J&J 
vaccine,37 which the US government helped to forge and for which it provided significant 
funding.38 Other voluntary arrangements include AstraZeneca’s deals with Serum Institute 
of India (SII),39 and Fiocruz in Brazil,40 and the recent announcement of BioNTech’s joint 
venture with Fosun Pharmaceuticals in China (which is separate from BioNTech’s existing 
agreement with Pfizer).41 These arrangements are certainly very positive; indeed, we favour 
the creation of further voluntary licensing arrangements for COVID-19, and we support 
governments’ attempts to establish these. However, such efforts to date simply remain 
grossly inadequate to meet the world’s needs in the pandemic context.42 
There must also be greater scrutiny of vaccine nationalism in the approaches of 
individual states, and a renewed focus on the sharing of vaccine surpluses between states 
to address the current vaccine inequity. We note that even where surplus supplies of 
vaccines have existed in some countries, such as in the US, these were prevented from 
being exported until very recently, through domestic prioritisation enforced by the US 
Defense Production Act (or were belatedly ‘loaned’ to neighbouring countries, such as 
Mexico and Canada).43  
 
35 TA Ghebreyesus, ‘Vaccine Nationalism Harms Everyone and Protects No One’ Foreign Policy (2 February 2021) 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/02/vaccine-nationalism-harms-everyone-and-protects-no-one/  
36 M Gaviria and B Kilic, ‘BioNTech and Pfizer’s BNT162 Vaccine Patent Landscape’ Public Citizen (16 Nov 2020)  
https://www.citizen.org/article/biontech-and-pfizers-bnt162-vaccine-patent-landscape/ - _ftnref3 (accessed 
24th May 2021). 
37 Merck, ‘Why we’re excited to partner on Johnson & Johnson’s COVID-19 vaccine’ (10 March 2021) 
https://www.merck.com/stories/why-were-excited-to-partner-on-johnson-and-johnsons-covid-19-vaccine/  
38 ‘Biden Administration Announces Historic Manufacturing Collaboration Between Merck and Johnson & 
Johnson to Expand Production of COVID-19 Vaccines’ (2 March 2021) 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/03/02/biden-administration-announces-historic-manufacturing-
collaboration-between-merck-johnson-johnson-expand-production-covid-19-vaccines.html  
39 ‘Serum Institute of India obtains emergency use authorisation in India for AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 vaccine’ 
(January 2021) https://www.astrazeneca.com/media-centre/press-releases/2021/serum-institute-of-india-
obtains-emergency-use-authorisation-in-india-for-astrazenecas-covid-19-vaccine.html  
40 ‘MSF welcomes Fiocruz’s step towards transparency of AstraZeneca deal’ (November 2020) 
https://msfaccess.org/msf-welcomes-fiocruzs-step-towards-transparency-astrazeneca-deal  
41 A Liu, ‘BioNTech, Fosun Pharma eye 1B doses of COVID-19 vaccine capacity with new China JV’ Fierce Pharma 
(10 May 2021) https://www.fiercepharma.com/manufacturing/biontech-fosun-pharma-eye-1b-doses-covid-19-
vaccine-capacity-new-china-jv  
42 It has been reported that the current manufacturing capacity for such vaccines globally stands at enough for 3.5 
billion doses but at least 11 billion will be needed to vaccine 70% of the total global population – see EFM ’t 
Hoen, ‘Covid shows the world it needs new rules to deal with pandemics’ Medicines Law and Policy (21 May 2021) 
https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2021/05/covid-shows-the-world-it-needs-new-rules-to-deal-with-
pandemics/ 
43 L Fedor, ‘US to share at least 20m more Covid vaccines with other countries’ Financial Times (17 May 2021) 
https://www.ft.com/content/3455a8e6-d232-4d5e-a0e1-140db03c8dcc; ‘US Loans Vaccines To Mexico, 
Canada’ NPR (23 March 2021) https://www.npr.org/2021/03/23/980449330/us-loans-vaccines-to-mexico-
canada?t=1621319881761  
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Very little production of COVID-19 vaccines is occurring in Africa, and production 
in South America lags well behind that of the US and Europe.44 Furthermore, as we explain 
below, relying heavily on a single producer – the Serum Institute of India (SII) – to provide 
for the international voluntary COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) programme 
led by WHO, CEPI and Gavi, has proven acutely inadequate to date.45 At the time of 
writing, given the current devastating COVID-19 crisis in India, the SII is banned from 
exporting any doses for the COVAX scheme, to concentrate on meeting the needs in 
India.46 A recent SII statement suggests it hopes ‘to start delivering to COVAX and other 
countries by the end of the year’ but this cannot be guaranteed.47 The short-term and 
medium-term risks to developing countries of the status quo continuing are incalculable, 




THE CURRENT COVID-19 VACCINE MARKET – ANALYSING 
INCENTIVES AND OUTLINING THE PROBLEMS OF PRICING AND 
SUPPLY 
 
The international and territorial patent system is often justified as a means to an end, 
providing incentives/rewards for risky and expensive research and development (R&D) 
spending, for the greater aim of creating public goods.49 The theoretical idea of ‘incentive’ 
or ‘promotion’ is captured in the architecture of the international patent legislation as 
embodied by TRIPS.50 Yet the ‘incentive to invent’ argument is usually framed in the 
context of a single legal system with a level of social, technical and economic development 
that can respond to such incentives.51 As we explore later on in this paper, the concept of 
 
44 ‘Editorial: The World Needs Many More Coronavirus Vaccines’ The New York Times (24 April 2021) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/opinion/covid-vaccines-poor-countries.html  
45 ‘WHO urges countries to donate COVID-19 vaccines as supplies tighten’ Reuters (27 March 2021) 
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/who-urges-countries-donate-10-mln-doses-
covid-19-vaccines-poorest-2021-03-26/  
46 S Findlay, M Peel and DP Mancini, ‘India’s block on vaccine exports deals blow to dozens of nations’ The Irish 
Times (26 March 2021) https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/india-s-block-on-vaccine-exports-
deals-blow-to-dozens-of-nations-1.4520812  
47 S Findlay and D Pilling, ‘Indian vaccine maker extends freeze on export of Covid jabs’ Financial Times (18 May 
2021) https://www.ft.com/content/63fbbb79-f657-4e6c-b190-cffd0d630593; See official Serum Institute of 
India public statement posted to social media on 18 May 2021 
https://twitter.com/SerumInstIndia/status/1394652001573629958/photo/1  
48 P Beaumont, ‘Why India’s worsening Covid crisis is a dire problem for the world’ The Guardian (25 April 2021) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/25/the-world-must-act-indias-covid-crisis-is-a-dire-problem-
for-us-all; See also M Davey, ‘Children with Covid: why are some countries seeing more cases – and deaths?’ The 
Guardian (23 May 2021) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/23/children-with-covid-why-are-
some-countries-seeing-more-cases-and-deaths  
49 L McDonagh, European Patent Litigation in the Shadow of the Unified Patent Court (Edward Elgar, 2016), 1–10. 
50 TRIPS Art. 7: Objectives ‘The promotion and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.’ 
51 S Sell, Power and Ideas: North–South politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (State University of New York Press, 
1997). 
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‘incentive’ within the international IP context underpinned by TRIPS is contestable, 
particularly in the light of varying levels of development in different states. The incentive 
justification can also become very muddled when ‘invention’ is equated erroneously with 
‘innovation’52 or when it does not take sufficient account of industry-specific contexts.53  
Even if we proceed on the basis that that patent law does create at least some 
incentives,54 as scholars our duty is to interrogate and analyse these incentives and their 
effects. We must ask the following question: what specific practices is the patent system 
incentivising?  
A patent creates a legal monopoly right in the use of the patented invention for 20 
years. It is, therefore, a restrictive right by definition, with the rationale of disabling 
competition temporarily. It is designed to bestow the holder with an exclusive right to an 
invention’s commodification and to give the holder a head-start for securing dominant 
market share. As a position of dominance becomes more secure, enabled by patent 
strategies and doctrine, incentives to share the technology may dissipate. Patent owners 
have the power to artificially restrict the production of the patented good for strategic 
reasons, for as long as legally possible.55 The monopoly right also enables the patent holder 
to exercise unfettered pricing power within a market. The trouble is that monopoly market 
power in the pharmaceutical industry has huge consequences for the public, unlike market 
domination in, say, mousetraps.56 Thus, patent law is fundamental to the way the 
pharmaceutical market is constructed; and as such, patent law must be considered a key 
factor when the market produces dysfunctional or inequitable results, as it is doing now 
during the COVID-19 crisis.57  
 
 
52 S Thambisetty, ‘Why Patent Law Doesn’t Do Innovation Policy’ LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 20/2013 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2328173; See also JA Schumpeter, Business Cycles – A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical 
Analysis of the Capitalist Process (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939) 85. 
53 DL Burk and M Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’ 89 Virginia Law Review (2003) 1575. 
54 In this respect, we do not concede the wider point – indeed, we critique the core assumptions of the incentive 
narrative further below. For a critical analysis of patent law’s underlying justification and patent value, see HY 
Kang, ‘Patents as Assets: Intellectual Property Rights as Market Subjects and Objects’ in K Birch and F Muniesa 
(Eds.), Assetization: Turning Things into Assets in Technoscientific Capitalism (MIT Press, 2020): ‘…the often voiced 
criticisms against patents, such as excluding production and labour from ownership, limiting access to patented 
inventions, exclusionary practices and unfettered pricing, are not novel. Patents are monopoly rights that have 
been created to legally sanction such practices and effects. These criticisms nonetheless raise serious doubts about 
the patent law system's underlying justification.’ For a critique of the inventive labour/incentive argument in 
patent justification, see HY Kang, ‘Patents as Credit – When Intellectual Property Becomes Speculative’ 194 
Radical Philosophy (2015) 29, at 30–31.  
55 S Thambisetty, ‘Vaccines and Patents: How Self-Interest and Artificial Scarcity Weaken Human Solidarity’ LSE 
Covid-19 blog (March 2021) https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2021/02/11/vaccines-and-patents-how-self-
interest-and-artificial-scarcity-weaken-human-solidarity/; For a discussion of the broader ‘governance’ functions 
patents bestow on rights-holders, see A McMahon, ‘Biotechnology, Health and Patents as Private Governance 
Tools: The Good, the Bad and the Potential for Ugly?’ Intellectual Property Quarterly (2020) 161. 
56 G Dutfield, That High Design of Purest Gold: A Critical History of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1880–2020 (World 
Scientific Publishing, 2020); See also TT Arvind & A McMahon, ‘Commodification, control, and the 
contractualisation of the human body’ in E Bertrand, M-X Catto, A Mornington (Eds.), The Limits of the Market: 
Commodification of nature and body (Mare & Martin, 2020). 
57 D Matthews, ‘Patenting Strategies and Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Implications for Access 
to Medicines’ 38 European Review of Intellectual Property (2016) 661. 
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Inequities affecting the global public are all the more glaring given that during the 
pandemic unprecedented amounts of public funding have gone into vaccine research, with 
several vaccines relying on major breakthroughs that occurred at universities and public 
institutions (including the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), Oxford University, and the 
US National Institutes of Health (NIH)).58 According to a recent medRxiv preprint, ‘public 
funding accounted for 97.1–99.0% of the funding towards the R&D of ChAdOx and the 
Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine’.59 In January 2021 it was reported that the global public 
sector had spent at least €93 billion on the development of COVID-19 vaccines and 
therapeutics – €85.6 billion of this on vaccines.60  
The inequities of vaccine production and distribution are related to concerns over 
pricing and the profit incentive.61 The present IP system allows for monopoly power in 
pricing, and Stoller suggests this potentially results in a perverse incentive for COVID-19 
vaccine manufacturers, one that does not necessarily favour achieving global equitable 
access to vaccines.62 From a purely financial perspective, the ongoing global pandemic 
offers considerable pecuniary incentives for companies making vaccines and their 
shareholders.63 The profit incentive and financial interests may clash with what is required 
to achieve the goal of bringing the pandemic to an end globally as soon as possible.64 As 
COVID-19 moves gradually from a ‘pandemic’ to ‘endemic’ scenario in HICs,65 a private 
market that seeks profit maximisation will likely incentivise and prioritise production of 
expensive vaccine booster doses for HICs (where these are needed) over first doses for 
 
58 See e.g., Oxford University’s patent application on the adenoviral vector (EP3475433A1), intention to grant 
communicated on 10 March 2021: 
https://worldwide.espacenet.com/patent/search/family/056891578/publication/EP3475433A1?q=EP347543
3A1. For background, see L McDonagh, ‘Could university patents stand in the way of universal global access to 
a COVID-19 vaccine?’ LSE Covid-19 blog (10 September 2020). 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/09/10/could-university-patents-stand-in-the-way-of-universal-global-
access-to-a-covid-19-vaccine/ 
59 S Cross, Y Rho, H Reddy, T Pepperrell, F Rodgers, R Osborne, A Eni-Olotu, R Banerjee, S Wimmer and S 
Keestra, ‘Who funded the research behind the Oxford-AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine? Approximating the 
funding to the University of Oxford for the research and development of the ChAdOx vaccine technology’ 
medRxiv (2021) preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.04.08.21255103 – this version posted 10 April 2021. 
NB: ChAdOx refers to the specific viral vector technology developed at Oxford.  
60 An estimated 71% of this funding went to SMEs – ‘Governments Spent at Least €93bn on COVID-19 Vaccines 
and Therapeutics During the Last 11 Months’ Business Wire (11 Jan 2021) 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210110005098/en; M Hoecklin, ‘€93 Billion Spent By Public 
Sector On COVID Vaccines and Therapeutics in 11 Months, Research Finds’ Health Policy Watch (12th January 
2021)https://healthpolicy-watch.news/81038-2/  
61 J Kollewe, ‘From Pfizer to Moderna: who’s making billions from Covid-19 vaccines?’ The Guardian (6 March 
2021)https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/mar/06/from-pfizer-to-moderna-whos-making-billions-
from-covid-vaccines  
62 M Stoller, ‘Why Joe Biden Punched Big Pharma in the Nose Over Covid Vaccines’ Substack (2021) 
https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/why-joe-biden-punched-big-pharma  
63 ‘Pfizer’s boss thinks Covid-19 is reshaping Big Pharma for the better’ The Economist (10 April 2021) 
https://www.economist.com/business/2021/04/10/pfizers-boss-thinks-covid-19-is-reshaping-big-pharma-
for-the-better  
64 P Patnaik & HY Kang, ‘India: The Quagmire for COVAX; Q&A: Hyo Yoon Kang on the financialization 
of intellectual property & COVID-19’ (20 April 2021) https://genevahealthfiles.substack.com/p/india-
the-quagmire-for-covax-q-and  
65 N Phillips, ‘The coronavirus is here to stay — here’s what that means’ Nature (16 February 2021) 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00396-2  
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LMICs.66 The expected need for ‘booster’ doses to address new variants of COVID-19 
will put further pressure on the already limited supplies of vaccines and existing 
manufacturing capacities. 
Although research suggests that the unit cost of production of a mRNA vaccine dose 
is less than US$3, Pfizer prices it at US$19.50.67 Claiming that this is ‘pandemic pricing’ 
and yielding around 20% gross profit margin, Pfizer states that in a non-pandemic 
environment it would be normally priced between US$150 and US$175, with further 
potential to significantly improve profit margin due to lower cost per unit with rising 
volume of production.68 Even with the current price of less than US$20, Pfizer is expected 
to generate US$26 billion in vaccine revenue in 2021.69  
Furthermore, although AZ has stated that it will supply vaccines ‘at cost’ so long as 
the pandemic is ongoing, its Memorandum of Understanding with Brazilian manufacturer, 
Fiocruz, reveals that AZ reserves the right to declare an end to the pandemic as soon as 
July 2021.70 There is evidence of LMICs being charged a higher price than HICs.71 For 
instance, AstraZeneca (AZ) reportedly charged South Africa more than double (US$5.25) 
the price per dose that it charged EU countries (US$2.16).72 Similar inequities have been 
observed in vaccine procurement deals with Uganda and Bangladesh.73 Even within India, 
pricing of the Oxford/AZ vaccine by the SII has not been equitable.74 Professor Louise 
Richardson, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford, defends the Oxford/AZ 
approach,75 noting that, unlike AZ, several other pharmaceutical companies ‘have derived 
 
66 N Triggle, ‘UK orders another 60m from Pfizer’ BBC (28 April 2021) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
56921018  
67 Z Kis, C Kontoravdi, R Shattock and N Shah, ‘Resources, Production Scales and Time Required for Producing 
RNA Vaccines for the Global Pandemic Demand’ Vaccines 2021, 9, 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/vaccines9010003  
68 Pfizer, Edited Transcript, Q4 2020 Earnings Call (2 February 2021) 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/317678438/files/doc_financials/2020/q4/PFE-USQ_Transcript_2021-02-02.pdf  
69 Pfizer Vaccine revenue is projected to hit $26bn in 2021 with production surge’ The Washington Post (4 May 2021) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/05/04/pfizer-covid-vaccine-revenue/  
70 DP Mancini, ‘AstraZeneca vaccine document shows limit of no-profit pledge’ Financial Times (7 October 2020) 
https://www.ft.com/content/c474f9e1-8807-4e57-9c79-6f4af145b686  
71 O Dwyer, ‘Covid-19: Countries are learning what others paid for vaccines’ BMJ (2021) 372 
https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n281  
72 H Sullivan, ‘South Africa paying more than double EU price for Oxford vaccine’ The Guardian (22 Jan 2021) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/22/south-africa-paying-more-than-double-eu-price-for-
oxford-astrazeneca-vaccine  
73 C Paun and A Furlong, ‘Poorer countries hit with higher price tag for Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine’ Politico (22 
February 2021) https://www.politico.eu/article/astrazeneca-vaccine-cost-higher-in-poorer-countries-
coronavirus/  
74 D Dodd, ‘India’s vaccine price move fuels criticism of pandemic strategy’ Financial Times (26 April 2021) 
https://www.ft.com/content/f257992c-7002-46b0-8d4e-7e2333442efc  
75 Oxford initially contemplated licensing the relevant IP and know-how openly, so that any viable producer could 
manufacture the vaccine but instead agreed an exclusive licence with AZ. McDonagh remarks:  
 
‘Credit where it is due: Oxford and AZ have acted more ethically than other providers such as Moderna and 
BioNTech/Pfizer. The Oxford-AZ deal includes the potential for non-exclusive, royalty-free licences to be 
offered to manufacturers to support production that is free-of-charge, at-cost, or at cost with limited margin 
supply. A bilateral licensing deal is in effect between Oxford/AZ and the Serum Institute India (SII). 
However, bilateral agreements, while positive, are ultimately limited in their scope ... Recent supply problems 
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enormous profits from the pandemic’.76 Notably, however, the financial markets are 
beginning to price in the technological and IP advantages obtained by AZ and Oxford.77 
AZ has enhanced its future prospects and share value, made clear by its recent award of 
US$3.6 billion in dividends.78 In April 2021, the Oxford University spin-off company that 
helped develop the vaccine – Vaccitech – filed its Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the US 
Nasdaq exchange, raising more than US$100 million.79  
Even if we assume that all companies will focus on developing first doses for LMICs 
– and this cannot be taken for granted – the potential need for booster doses could split 
current manufacturing capacity, dividing it between (HICs’) vaccine boosters and 
(LMICs’) first doses, thereby likely maintaining, or even increasing, the current vaccine 
access gap. In short, the current (largely unregulated) power of vaccine makers to decide 
when and where to produce, to decide price, and to define when the current crisis will 
have abated for pricing purposes, is not likely to create the right incentives to boost global 




FRAMING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSE: C-TAP, COVAX 
AND THE TRIPS WAIVER PROPOSAL 
 
Aside from the current TRIPS waiver proposal, which we discuss in detail further in the 
next section, there are two existing, relevant and significant World Health Organization 
(WHO) global initiatives for pandemic response – the COVID-19 Technology Access 
Pool (C-TAP) and COVAX – and each incorporates different approaches and 
understandings of the role of IP and knowledge sharing in the fight against COVID-19.80 
 
arising from AZ’s failure to meet its production targets led AZ to seek to import to the UK millions of 
vaccine doses made in India at SII. Were it not for AZ’s UK and European production shortfalls, these doses 
would, presumably, have been made available to developing countries (via COVAX). The idea that AZ would 
attempt to prioritise UK supply needs over those of developing countries calls into question the ultimate 
value of the agreement between AZ and SII.’ 
 
L McDonagh, ‘Oxford University has a special duty to ensure jabs reach the Global South’ LSE Covid-19 blog 
(April 2021) https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2021/04/28/oxford-university-has-a-special-responsibility-to-
ensure-jabs-reach-the-global-south/ 
76 L Richardson, ‘Time for other vaccine makers to follow Oxford/AstraZeneca’s lead’ Financial Times (18 May 
2021) https://www.ft.com/content/65856fab-e394-4407-adf9-63edd8acdad3  
77 L McDonagh, ‘Oxford University has a special duty to ensure jabs reach the Global South’ LSE Covid-19 blog 
(April 2021) https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2021/04/28/oxford-university-has-a-special-responsibility-to-
ensure-jabs-reach-the-global-south/ 
78 S Boseley, ‘Campaign to waive Covid jab patent highlights $26bn shareholder payouts’ The Guardian (22 April 
2021) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/22/campaign-to-waive-covid-jab-patent-highlights-
26bn-shareholder-payouts  
79 A Keown, ‘AstraZeneca Vaccine Collaborator Vaccitech Snares $110.5 Million IPO’ Biospace (30 April 2021) 
https://www.biospace.com/article/vaccitech-raises-110-5-million-in-ipo/  
80 For a detailed discussion of the various current global mechanisms for global equitable access to COVID-19 
vaccines, see S Geiger & A McMahon, ‘Too many Cooks or Too Many Recipes? An analysis of the institutional 
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As we outline here, these initiatives have not (at the time of writing) succeeded in ensuring 
global vaccine access. It is these failings and, in particular, the lack of industry 
engagement/co-operation with voluntary systems like the C-TAP, that have necessitated 
the TRIPS waiver proposal.81 
 
C-TAP AND COVAX 
 
The C-TAP scheme can be traced to Costa Rica’s call for a voluntary pool of IP, data 
and know-how etc. in March 2020.82 In response to this, the WHO in partnership with 
the Government of Costa Rica launched C-TAP in May 2020 as an internationally co-
ordinated mechanism of voluntary sharing of IP, data and know-how etc. in the fight 
against COVID-19.83 C-TAP is based on the model of the UN-backed Medicines Patent 
Pool (which is also an implementing partner of C-TAP) that aims to provide equitable 
access to HIV medication and treatment, and for other conditions.84 Yet, to date, the 
pharmaceutical industry has largely ignored C-TAP; it has not received formal co-
operation from vaccine rights-holders.85  
The other major international response is the COVAX scheme, launched in April 
2020 by the WHO. Standing in contrast to C-TAP, COVAX operates as a public–private 
initiative, supported by HICs, the UN, CEPI and the Gates Foundation.86 COVAX is 
arguably designed to meet immediate, rather than systemic needs87 – it is a global 
mechanism whereby states can come together to purchase vaccines. This scheme 
comprises self-financing and also funded countries, including 92 LMICs.88  
COVAX is far from flawless – it has several problematic governance issues.89 
Nevertheless, COVAX has achieved some successes in delivering some vaccines to 
LMICs. Nonetheless, optimistically, if it attains the current prediction COVAX will have 
distributed approximately 1.8 billion doses of vaccines to 92 participating LMICs by the 
 
landscape and proliferation of proposals for Global Vaccine Equity for COVID-19’ UCD Geary Institute Working 
Paper 8/21 (2021). 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ucd/wpaper/202108.html  
81 This is correct as of 19 May 2021. 
82 E Silverman, ‘WHO is asked to create a voluntary intellectual property pool to develop Covid-19 products’ Stat 
News (24 March 2020) https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/03/24/covid19-coronavirus-costa-rica-
intellectual-property/  
83 See details at https://www.who.int/initiatives/covid-19-technology-access-pool  
84 See details at https://medicinespatentpool.org/ 
85 EFM ’t Hoen, ‘The elephant in the room at the WHO Executive Board’ Medicines Law and Policy (22 January 2021) 
https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2021/01/the-elephant-in-the-room-at-the-who-executive-board/  
86 See details at https://www.gavi.org/gavi-covax-amc-launch-event-april-2021  
87 S Geiger & A McMahon, ‘Too many Cooks or Too Many Recipes? An analysis of the institutional landscape and 
proliferation of proposals for Global Vaccine Equity Access for COVID-19’ UCD Geary Institute Working Paper 
8/21 (2021). See also K Walsh, A Wallace, M Pavis, N Olszowy, J Griffin and N Hawkins, ‘Intellectual Property 
Rights and Access in Crisis’ 52 IIC (2021) 379. 
88 See details at https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained  
89 P Patnaik, ‘Gavi & Civil Society: Unhappy Engagement’ Geneva Health Files Newsletter 4 (24 Sep 2020). See also J 
Ravelo, ‘Is Covax Part of the Problem or the Solution?’ Devex (11 March 2021) https://www.devex.com/news/is-
covax-part-of-the-problem-or-the-solution-99334  
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end of 2021 – covering just over one-fifth of their populations.90 This would, of course, 
be very welcome; but it falls significantly short of the needed population coverage, thereby 
failing to limit the risks of new variants arising, prolonging the pandemic.91 However, there 
are cogent reasons to be pessimistic about achieving even this moderate goal. The 
COVAX system continues to underdeliver vaccines, failing to meet stated targets, due 
both to vaccine nationalism in HICs and to the absolute lack of vaccines worldwide. Such 
issues will likely be heightened in coming months, without action, because, as noted, the 
devastating second wave of COVID-19 in India has led the government there to prevent 
the Serum Institute of India (the key vaccine manufacturer supplying to COVAX92) from 
supplying exports, instead focusing on the public health need in India.93 In March 2021, 
Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus (DG WHO) stated that: 
 
COVAX is ready to deliver, but we can’t deliver vaccines we don’t have. As you 
know, bilateral deals, export bans, vaccine nationalism and vaccine diplomacy have 
caused distortions in the market, with gross inequities in supply and demand.94 
 
While systems like COVAX have a role to play to meet short-term needs, a model based 
on philanthropy and charity will not build sustainable medium- or long-term solutions. 
COVAX does not address productive or innovative capacities in the countries that most 
rely on it. Nor can so-called geopolitical ‘vaccine diplomacy’ suffice to ensure equitable 
vaccine access. For example, until the recent prevention of exports, India was using 
vaccine diplomacy as a geopolitical gambit, reportedly supplying 64.5 million doses to 85 
different countries.95 Such endeavours may have positive effects globally but are ultimately 
inadequate.  
 
THE TRIPS WAIVER  
 
As noted above, the WHO’s C-TAP scheme has not, to date, been supported by 
industry (and there are also concerns about a lack of support for a similar vehicle, the 
 
90 The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, Access to Vaccines, Therapeutics and 
Diagnostics: Background Paper 5 (May 2021) 1–7 https://theindependentpanel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/05/Background-paper-5-Access-to-vaccines-Therapeutics-and-Diagnostics.pdf  
91 Ibid, 7 
92WHO, ‘COVAX reaches over 100 economies, 42 days after first international delivery’ (8 April 2021) 
https://www.who.int/news/item/08-04-2021-covax-reaches-over-100-economies-42-days-after-first-
international-delivery  
93 M Safi and A Kirk, ‘Revealed: big shortfall in Covax Covid vaccine-sharing scheme’ (22 April 2021) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/22/revealed-big-shortfall-in-covax-covid-vaccine-sharing-
scheme; See also SII public statement extending the suspension of delivery at 
https://twitter.com/SerumInstIndia/status/1394652001573629958/photo/1  
94 World Health Organization (WHO), ‘WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on 
COVID-19’ (26 March 2021) https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-
opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19-26-march-2021  
95 ‘Covid Diplomacy: How Indian’s “Vaccine Maitry” Jabs have put China on the Ropes’ (26 Jan 2021) 
https://www.news18.com/news/india/covid-diplomacy-how-indias-vaccine-maitri-jabs-have-put-china-on-
the-ropes-3339179.html  
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mRNA Vaccine Transfer Hub facility).96 Meanwhile, COVAX has fallen considerably 
short of LMICs’ needs. Concerns around the effect that intellectual property rights were 
having on global equitable access to health technologies for COVID-19, and the 
foreseeable inequity of vaccine access which was thought likely to arise once vaccines were 
approved for use, prompted India and South Africa, in October 2020, to put forward the 
TRIPS waiver. India and South Africa proposed that World Trade Organization (WTO) 
members should  
 
‘work together to ensure that intellectual property [IP] rights such as patents, 
industrial designs, copyright and protection of undisclosed information do not create 
barriers to the timely access to affordable medical products including vaccines and 
medicines or to scaling-up of research, development, manufacturing and supply of 
medical products essential to combat Covid-19’.97  
 
Justifying the proposal by reference to ‘exceptional circumstances’, India and South Africa 
called for a waiver that would ‘continue until widespread vaccination is in place globally, 
and the majority of the world’s population has developed immunity’.  
This call has not been heeded at successive WTO meetings, though it received a 
recent boost in May 2021 via US support for a narrower IP waiver applying only to 
vaccines against COVID-19.98 Although sometimes referred to in shorthand as a ‘patent 
waiver’, in both its original and revised forms the India/South Africa proposal is in fact a 
broad package,99 applicable to diagnostics, treatments and vaccines. It is currently co-
sponsored by 62 WTO countries (including India/South Africa).100 The waiver would 
apply ‘in relation to prevention, containment or treatment of COVID-19’, covering not 
only the temporary waiver of patents (and, where relevant, copyrights) internationally, but 
also, crucially, the sharing of IP under the umbrella of ‘undisclosed information’ such as 
trade secrets and know-how.101  
 
96 World Health Organization (WHO), ‘Establishment of a COVID-19 mRNA vaccine technology transfer hub to 
scale up global manufacturing (Expression of interest)’ (16 April 2021) https://www.who.int/news-
room/articles-detail/establishment-of-a-covid-19-mrna-vaccine-technology-transfer-hub-to-scale-up-global-
manufacturing  
97 Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of 
Covid-19. Communication from India and South Africa (2 Oct 2020) IP/C/W/669 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True (accessed 
24th May 2021). See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994) (TRIPS). See revised TRIPS waiver 
text of 21 May 2021 at https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/W669Rev1.pdf 
98 ‘Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on the Covid-19 Trips Waiver’ (5 May 2021) https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-
waiver  
99 J Bosse, H Y Kang, S Thambisetty, ‘There is more to the story than vaccine patents’ The Conversation (7 May 2021) 
https://theconversation.com/trips-waiver-theres-more-to-the-story-than-vaccine-patents-160502  
100 Joint Statement of Co-Sponsors to the TRIPS Waiver (17 May 2021) 
https://www.pmindiaun.gov.in/public_files/assets/pdf/Cosponsors'_Joint_Statement_17_May_2021.pdf  
101 Ibid. See revised TRIPS waiver text of 21 May 2021 at https://www.keionline.org/wp-
content/uploads/W669Rev1.pdf . Undisclosed information of commercial nature, such as trade secrets, are 
protected under Art 39 of TRIPS, ‘except where necessary to protect the public’. 
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In principle, this kind of ‘sharing’ is not new.102 The 2011 WHO Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Framework makes explicit reference to technology transfer, albeit in 
the somewhat limited context of benefit sharing (in return for receiving biological 
materials), and it offers language that is short of a legal obligation. However, some of it 
bears repeating here. Section 6.13.4 states as follows: 
 
‘Influenza vaccine manufacturers who receive PIP biological materials may grant, 
subject to any existing licensing restrictions, on mutually agreed terms, a non-
exclusive, royalty-free licence to any influenza vaccine manufacturer from a 
developing country, to use its intellectual property and other protected substances, 
products, technology, know-how, information and knowledge used in the process of 
influenza vaccine development and production, in particular for pre-pandemic and 
pandemic vaccines for use in agreed developing countries.’ 
 
In line with this, we argue that the TRIPS waiver could help stimulate the building of 
capacity in LMICs.103 As noted earlier, since the coming into force of TRIPS in 1995, 
LMICs’ industrial and pharmaceutical capacity has been hindered by the lack of technology 
transfer from HICs.104 Even when technology has been transferred, undisclosed licensing 
terms covering patents and other IP rights typically restrict how transferred technologies 
can be used and to what extent the resultant products – in this case vaccines – may be 
diffused within and across national boundaries. These issues are complex, and as we 




KEY ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSED TRIPS WAIVER – PATENTS AND 
TRADE SECRETS 
 
The TRIPS waiver puts into sharp relief the different layers of property rights that often 
ringfence innovation and operate as assets in the world economy.105 Like a matryoshka 
doll, the inner core of an invention is often wrapped with different layers of IP rights, each 
possessing a differing rationale, scope and subject matter. We focus here on the two key 
IP rights for present purposes: patents and trade secrets (interpreted widely to include 
know-how, data and other undisclosed information).  
A patent is a monopoly on an invention granted to an inventor/owner by one or 
more patent offices, with specification documentation made public, and which is protected 
 
102 A Kapczynski, ‘Order without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza’ 102 Cornell Law Review 
(2017) 1539. 
103 P Erfani, LO Gostin and V Kerry, ‘Beyond a symbolic gesture: What’s needed to turn the IP waiver into Covid-
19 vaccines’ Stat News (19 May 2021) https://www.statnews.com/2021/05/19/beyond-a-symbolic-gesture-
whats-needed-to-turn-the-ip-waiver-into-covid-19-vaccines/  
104 KC Shadlen, S Guennif, A Guzmán and N Lalitha (Eds.), Intellectual Property, Pharmaceuticals and Public Health: 
Access to Drugs in Developing Countries (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
105 HY Kang, ‘Patents as Assets: Intellectual Property Rights as Market Subjects and Objects’ in K Birch and F 
Muniesa (Eds.), Assetization: Turning Things into Assets in Technoscientific Capitalism (MIT Press, 2020). 
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exclusively under TRIPS for 20 years.106 A trade secret (which under TRIPS relates to 
undisclosed information and can include know-how) is another key monopoly – but by its 
nature a trade secret is not public; such secrets are instead protected perpetually (usually 
under contract or non-disclosure agreements (NDAs)).107 Such information is protected 
as long as it can remain secret, tacit, informal or uncodified.108 As we explore below, in 
order for the TRIPS waiver to be fully effective for COVID-19 vaccines, it needs to 
comprise not only a patent waiver for COVID-19 vaccines, but also provide mechanisms 
by which trade secrets in the latest vaccine manufacturing know-how can be shared by 
transferring technology and disclosing data. 
In general terms, it is a twist of the patent-trade secret duopoly that IP legal incentives 
are structured in such a way that inventions that are easily replicable, or reverse-engineered, 
tend to be patented; for if such an invention lacks patent protection, then it will be easily 
read, reverse-engineered and reproduced by competitors. On the other hand, if an 
invention is genuinely difficult to replicate, it may make more strategic commercial sense 
to hold that inventive information as a trade secret – and potentially obtain longer 
protection than the 20 years a patent allows. When companies produce and market such a 
product, they rely on the fact that no one can easily ‘read’ or reverse-engineer it.  
Yet, as we outline below, inadequate patent disclosures, combined with additional 
formal trade secrets and tacit know-how, can muddy the waters, making it difficult to judge 
where a legitimate legal incentive ends, and where restrictive practices around sharing of 
information begin. Such an overlap of varied intellectual property rights with differential 
levels of – or no – disclosure is exacerbated in a pandemic situation, when trade secrets 
obstruct the sharing of know-how and the technology transfer needed for COVID-19 
vaccine manufacturing.  
Put simply, where there is an immediate and extraordinary health need for vaccines 
to address the global crisis, the ordinary models of information facilitation within the IP 
system are not enough. For example, although Moderna declared in 2020 that it would not 
enforce its patents related to COVID-19 vaccines during the pandemic, this decision by 
Moderna did not encompass all IP, such as trade secrets/know-how, and it excluded tech-
transfer.109 In fact, Moderna recently admitted that without this relevant know-how and 
technology transfer, others seeking to manufacture their vaccine would face significant 
hurdles, for example, in scaling manufacturing.110 This calls into question the rationale 
behind their promise not to enforce their patents during the pandemic (and arguably 
 
106 Art 33 TRIPS, states: ‘The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty 
years counted from the filing date.’ 
107 Art 39 TRIPS. 
108 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994) (TRIPS). 
109 Z Brennan, ‘Moderna CEO brushes off US support for IP waiver, eyes more than $19b in covid-19 vaccine 
sales in 2021’ EndPoints News (6 May 2021) https://endpts.com/moderna-ceo-brushes-off-us-support-for-ip-
waiver-eyes-more-than-19b-in-covid-19-vaccine-sales-in-2021/  
110 Moderna sees no impact on COVID-19 vaccine from potential patent waiver’ Reuters (6 May 2021) 
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/moderna-raises-2021-sales-forecast-covid-19-
vaccine-192-bln-2021-05-06/ 
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reveals it to be an empty gesture).111 As we explore below, the TRIPS waiver must assess 
ways of facilitating increased production of vaccines via measures addressing both patents 




Patent law requires disclosure of information relevant to the invention with the aim 
of ultimately benefiting the public domain of knowledge; yet the operation of this 
requirement during the pandemic exposes the deficiencies and limits of the way disclosure 
is doctrinally, normatively and strategically constructed. There are three specific 
deficiencies which are relevant in the context of the TRIPS waiver. The first of these is 
the insufficiency of disclosure that has developed doctrinally and in practice that does not 
necessarily match the requirement of ‘disclosure’ as a quid pro quo for the grant of a patent 
monopoly right. The second is the fact that there is a lag in publications of patent 
applications, either individually, or within patent families, for extended periods of time. 
The third is demonstrated by the strategic possibilities created by overlapping patent rights. 
As explored below, taken together these three deficiencies make it difficult to disentangle 
the patent thicket.  
First, patents require inventors to disclose information about their inventions with 
the patent applicant obliged to describe the invention and enable others in the field to 
carry out the invention, yet arguably not in significant scientific or technical detail.112 The 
information disclosed at the time of publication of a patent application is not available to 
the public for use during the duration of the patent. This is a requirement that is expressed 
in utilitarian terms as the ‘patent bargain’, though its centrality to theoretical 
understandings of patents is contested. The many theories that explain how the patent 
bargain works or ought to work show a fragmented picture – and as Burk and Lemley 
state, such theories are not ‘wrong in as much as they are incomplete’ – some are more 
plausible than others about how patents work or should work in particular industries.113 
Broadly speaking, the fact that the patent system sets up a ‘patent race’ – a winner-takes-
all system for the first to file an application – means that disclosure often occurs very early 
in the process of filing. In practice, the disclosure requirement underperforms, and 
speculative filing of merely ‘plausible’ or ‘credible’ information is common.114 The 
scepticism about patent disclosures is noted by several scholars who have suspicions about 
its practical value.115 
 
111 Ibid. Moderna has not obtained a licence for the US NIH patent relevant to its vaccine. See C Morten, L Boman, 
J Rabinovitsj and C Rohr, ‘U.S. 10,960,070: The U.S. Government’s New Important Coronavirus Vaccine Patent’ 
NYU TLP Clinic Report on NIH’s 070 Patent’ (14 April 2021), available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/1om1v1kagg7j9dn/NYU%20TLP%20Clinic%20Report%20on%20NIH%27s%
20070%20Patent%2020210414%20%28FINAL%29.pdf?dl=0  
112 HS Frost, ‘The Unique Problem of Inventions Which Are Fully Enabled and Fully Described, But Not Fully 
Understood (Merrell Dow's Terfenadine Revisited)’ 20 Intellectual Property Journal (2007) 369. 
113 DL Burk and M Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’ 89 Virginia Law Review (2003) 1575. 
114 JC Fromer, ‘Patent Disclosure’ 94 Iowa Law Review (2009) 539. 
115 See for instance SB Seymore, ‘The Teaching Function of Patents’ 85 Notre Dame Law Review (2010) 621 and DL 
Burk, ‘The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification’ 23 Berkeley Technology Law Journal (2008) 1009. 
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Patent law typically does not mandate further disclosures post-grant, when underlying 
technologies may become better understood.116 This can be a problem for not just for 
product but also process patents when details regarding manufacturing processes are never 
revealed in a patent application, or can be fragmented in multiple patent applications. 
Additionally, information generated to fulfil regulatory requirements (discussed below) is 
not currently part of, or linked to, the disclosure in related patents. In a substantial body 
of work,117 Arti Rai argues that enhancing patent disclosures through the use of regulatory 
levers would help patent offices assess whether adequate disclosure has been made in 
patent applications, which would be valuable not only for competition but also for 
innovation.118 
Second, intellectual property offices are only obliged to publish patent applications 
within 18 months of filing and during this period the information is inaccessible to the 
public.119 Therefore, it is not entirely clear at present which patents actually exist in the 
field of COVID-19 vaccines – a field that has developed rapidly in the last year. In practice, 
the time at which disclosure truly occurs can be much later, for various reasons. For 
example, Yale’s patent application with GlaxoSmithKline for an mRNA-based malaria 
vaccine was only published in February 2021 and has a priority date of February 2014, due 
to the continuation of different patent applications and the practice of grouping them into 
a single patent family.120  
Third, the existence of overlapping rights also makes it much harder to decipher the 
IP landscape over some technologies and products. This is related to the first point above 
and impacts on the exactitude of property boundaries that are necessary for legal 
transactions.121 Multiple patent applications with minor modifications from an original 
application grow into patent families, with dozens and even hundreds of patents existing 
over the same product. These overlapping rights can result in a de facto extension of patent 
protection beyond the initial 20 years.122 This is a particularly acute problem in the 
pharmaceutical industry, where persistently long monopolies created by thickets of patents 
can arise, making it difficult for competitors to identify whether or not the technology is 
still protected.123 Companies can amass vast numbers of patents in order to hold back and 
increase the duration and scope of their monopolies – practices that have come under the 
 
116 JC Fromer, ‘Dynamic Patent Disclosure’ 69 Vanderbilt Law Review (2016) 1715. 
117 See Rai’s body of work including the presentation A Rai, ‘Biosimilars and Manufacturing Trade Secrets’ 
(https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Rai_Arti.pdf) and the in-depth co-authored works: WN Price and A Rai, 
‘Are Trade Secrets Delaying Biosimilars?’ 348 Science (2015) 188; and WN Price and A Rai, ‘How Logically 
Impossible Patents Block Biosimilars’ 37 Nature Biotechnology (2019) 862. 
118 WN Price II and A Rai, ‘Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation’ 101 Iowa Law Review 
(2016) 1023 at 1031 
119 SB Seymore, ‘The Teaching Function of Patents’ 85 Notre Dame Law Review (2010) 621. 
120 USP Application 2021003085. 
121 S Thambisetty, ‘Patents as Credence Goods’ 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2007) 707 and MA Lemley and C 
Shapiro, ‘Probabilistic Patents’ 19 Journal of Economic Perspectives 75. 
122 See details provided by iMak in their presentation, ‘The Patent System is a Bottle Neck for Medicines’ (17 Dec 
2020) https://www.i-mak.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Patents-101-2020-12-17.pdf  
123 O Gurgula, ‘Strategic accumulation of patents in the pharmaceutical industry and patent thickets in complex 
technologies – two different concepts sharing similar features’ 48 International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law (2017) 385. 
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spotlight both in the US124 and in the EU.125 Even in a relatively novel technological arena, 
such as in the case of mRNA technologies that are the basis of some of the recently 
produced COVID-19 vaccines, previous patents exist; indeed, a recent study shows there 
are already patent thickets in the mRNA field.126 Consequently, novel mRNA vaccines 
already present a fragmented and complex landscape of rights – as confirmed in a recent 
network analysis study of mRNA vaccine-related patents.127 Patent law’s disclosure 
function is therefore quite limited in practice in this context – and any inventive 
knowledge-dissemination is deferred in its timeframe. In a pandemic, this practical 
problem hinders the swift sharing of scientific and technical information with the public 
and within the scientific community.  
To summarise, there are at least three (related) problems in the current vaccine-patent 
landscape: insufficient disclosure, a lack of transparency and the strategic layering of rights 
that increases the opacity of which technologies are being used or are necessary. On 
disclosure, we note that despite the narrative of the so-called patent bargain, in reality the 
patent disclosure model is often inadequate; furthermore, since multiple inventions are 
required to produce a successful vaccine, what is disclosed in separate patent applications 
will likely not be sufficient to enable production of a technology like a vaccine which may 
involve multiple patented inventions. On transparency, it may not be entirely clear what 
specific patents exist within a field and to whom they belong, which creates thickets. This 
in turn poses difficulties for other parties wishing to work within the field, potentially 
limiting (or at least clouding) their freedom to operate, and creating uncertainty about 
whether their subsequent inventions may be infringing or patentable on their own terms. 
This uncertainty (as we detail further below) may create situations in which it is unclear 
whom to ask for a licence to produce a health technology, such as a vaccine, given that 
many different rights (and rights-holders) may be relevant to the production of any one 
vaccine. On overlapping patent rights, we observe that this can encourage strategic and 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of those who claim partial ownership of a technology 
landscape. We note that such opportunistic behaviour is not a unique function of the 
pandemic; it is long standing in its nature and it is not prohibited by patent law. 
Nevertheless, we recognise that it leads to significant constraints on the ability to intervene 
on public policy grounds both domestically and internationally. Considered together the 
above three deficiencies of the patent system make it difficult to disentangle the patent 
thicket, indicating that a specific, limited waiver of (only) patent rights would not be 
 
124 R Knox and G Curfman, ‘The Humira Patent Thicket and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine’ (2021) – 




125 EU Commission, Antitrust: shortcomings in pharmaceutical sector require further action (8 July 2009) IP/09/1098  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_09_1098  
126 The Penn mRNA patents are licensed to BioNTech; Moderna is using a NIH mRNA patent without a licence, 
and there are also other university patents on vaccines that use mRNA technology (e.g., Yale). See C Martin and 
D Lowery, ‘mRNA vaccines: Intellectual Property Landscape’ 19 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery (2020) 578. 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41573-020-00119-8  
127 M Gaviria and B Kilic, ‘A network analysis of COVID-19 mRNA vaccine patents’ 39 Nature Biotechnology (2021) 
546. 
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sufficient to make available all the knowledge and information that is in fact needed; as we 
outline below, a broad IP waiver is required. 
 
UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION: TRADE SECRETS, NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS, 
DATA EXCLUSIVITY AND REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITY 
 
We define undisclosed information broadly here to include not only trade secrets, but 
also information about the invention, data gathered during the regulatory approval 
process, or other kinds of exclusive information – for example, information about dead 
ends, trials and errors – which are not disclosed to the public.128  
In contrast to the public interest justification carried by patent law’s limited disclosure 
requirement in return for monopoly rights, trade secrets are, by their nature, not disclosed 
publicly at all. In normal business practice, holders of IP related to vaccines cannot be 
obliged to divulge the trade secrets and know-how that are essential for the vaccine 
manufacturing and distribution process.129 This is one of the most evident and difficult to 
surpass barriers. Relatedly, it has been reported that non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) 
are in place – for instance, between Pfizer and BioNTech and their suppliers130 – which 
reportedly may legally prevent these companies from participating in initiatives such as C-
TAP or the WHO’s mRNA technology transfer hub.131 The extensive use of NDAs has 
been reported in Malaysia where it was emphasised that a breach could lead to non-delivery 
of vaccines.132  
Undisclosed information may also include information that can be protected 
separately from the IP framework within TRIPS, for example, via ‘data exclusivity’ rights 
that ensure that safety data from clinical trials are proprietary. In the US, complex biologics 
can have 12 years of exclusivity for the originators; and in the EU protection can apply for 
up to 10 years (up to 8 years’ data exclusivity and 2 additional years’ marketing 
exclusivity).133  
 
128 M Risch, ‘Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?’ 11 Intellectual Property Law Review (2007) 1 
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol11/iss1/1  
129 B Mercurio, ‘WTO Waiver from Intellectual Property Protection for COVID-19 Vaccines and Treatments: A 
Critical Review’ Virginia Journal of International Law (forthcoming 2021) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3789820 (accessed 24th May 2021). 
130 ‘Any information that constitutes a trade secret (as defined under Law), in which case Receiving Party will 
continue to be bound by its obligation of confidentiality and non-use under this Agreement for so long as such 
information continues to constitute a trade secret, but in no event for a period of less than the five (5) year period 
specified immediately above.’ Supply Agreement Pfizer and BioNTech with TriLink Biotechnologies (9 October 
2020) https://contracts.justia.com/companies/maravai-lifesciences-holdings-inc-11469/contract/137780/  
131 M Safi, ‘WHO platform for pharmaceutical firms unused since pandemic began’ The Guardian (22 Jan 2021) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/22/who-platform-for-pharmaceutical-firms-unused-since-
pandemic-began  
132 See details at https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2020/12/652459/vaccine-deal-stake-if-info-revealed  
133 Medicines Law and Policy, Data Exclusivity in the EU: A Briefing Document (June 2019) available at 
https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/European-Union-Review-of-Pharma-
Incentives-Data-Exclusivity.pdf – in addition, one more year of protection can be obtained in the EU context 
for new indications with significant clinical benefit, as noted at 5. 
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There is the related concern that in the case of vaccines, issues of regulatory 
exclusivity (and related secrecy issues) are particularly important. As the technology is new, 
there is no regulatory pathway for generic versions of, for example, a viral vector vaccine 
such as the Oxford-AZ one (a complex biologic). In other words, there is no easy answer 
as to how a new manufacturer ‘would scientifically demonstrate that its vaccine is similar 
enough to one of the existing vaccines to rely on its clinical trial data’.134 Even if technical 
know-how were shared and patents waived, a new generic manufacturer would struggle to 
bring a product swiftly to the market if the biologics’ regulatory data were not shared, 
because clinical trials would need to be conducted from scratch. Expedited or truncated 
regulatory pathways are of course possible. For example, the Indian government has 
granted emergency use approval in India for vaccines which have been granted emergency 
approval for restricted use by US, European, UK and Japanese regulatory bodies or which 
are listed in WHO’s Emergency Use Listing.135 
Given these challenges, some commentators claim that the centrality of undisclosed 
information undermines the case for the TRIPS waiver.136 However, as we argue below, 
these complexities actually underline the need for the eventual text of the waiver to address 





HOW THE TRIPS WAIVER CAN ADDRESS BOTH PATENTS AND 
UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION 
 
The specific challenges we highlighted above regarding patents (transparency and 
disclosure) and undisclosed information (trade secrets and know-how, NDAs, data 
exclusivity, regulatory exclusivity) demonstrate the systemic complexity of the current 
pharmaceutical model for vaccines. Nevertheless, this should not be read as supporting 
the case against the proposed TRIPS waiver. Rather, on the contrary, these issues 
strengthen the case for a comprehensive IP waiver, because in the absence of sufficient 
voluntary sharing/licensing by industry to meet pandemic needs, a simple patent waiver 
on its own would not be enough to boost production.  
 
134 JS Sherkow, LL Oullette, N Price and R Sachs, ‘Are Patents the Cause of – or Solution to – Covid-19 Vaccine 
Innovation Problems (No!)?’ (4 Mar 2021) https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2021/03/are-patents-
cause-ofor-solution-tocovid.html. In the US, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 contains provisions 
affecting the transparency of patent information relating to US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-licensed 
biologics. 
135 Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Press Release, 13 April 2021 GOI. 
136 A Houldsworth, ‘TRIPS Covid Vaccine IP Waiver fails to address crucial questions’ IAM (20 April 2021) 
https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/trips-covid-vaccine-ip-waiver-proposal-fails-address-crucial-
questions  
137 It also bolsters the argument that the waiver may not be an end point, but rather that it can accompany additional 
measures, where needed. These may include relevant international or national/domestic/regional (e.g., EU) legal 
measures to be adopted to ‘clear the way’ of obstacles to efficient operation of the waiver, such as specific 
measures to address the topics of regulatory data, and to incentivise/mandate sharing of know-how and 
technology transfer. 
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The TRIPS waiver as envisaged by India/South Africa would come into play as a 
temporary waiver of all relevant IP.138 This would include, but would not be limited to, 
patents. Given the problems of disclosure, transparency and overlapping patents outlined 
above, the benefit of a universal waiver of patents on COVID-19 vaccines and health 
technologies is that it would allow manufacturers freedom to operate without the risk of 
litigation or the fear that exported vaccines could be seized in transit and impounded for 
alleged patent infringement.139 As we discuss further (in the next sub-section), the TRIPS 
waiver has substantial benefits in this respect over the often-cumbersome and onerous 
system of compulsory licensing of patents. 
Trade secrets are vital, and while supporting the waiver, we do not shy away from the 
challenges highlighted by waiver sceptics. For instance, Hilty et al. argue that it is ‘highly 
unlikely that the waiver of trade secret protection could be effectively implemented and 
enforced to propel companies to disclose all relevant know-how’.140 However, given the 
absence of adequate industry co-operation on voluntary sharing of trade secrets, this overly 
pessimistic view ends up propping up a status quo that is failing LMICs. We acknowledge 
that the circumstances under which entities may be forced to disclose commercially 
sensitive or tacit technical knowledge may be limited; but they are certainly not without 
precedent.141 In fact, governments can utilise the waiver, and, if necessary, bring into 
domestic law accompanying measures, to incentivise and mandate the sharing of 
previously undisclosed information, broadly conceived.142 Therefore, we argue in favour 
of using the TRIPS waiver as part of a ‘carrot and stick’ approach. Here, the question of 
whether and when to use incentives (‘carrots’) for voluntary disclosures, or mandates 
(‘sticks’) for the disclosure of previously undisclosed information, is pertinent. In practice, 
incentives may be more palatable, politically, than mandates.143  
A combination of incentives and mandates to achieve technology transfer is precisely 
what happened in the 1940s when, in a wartime situation and with no time to lose, the 
United States Office of Scientific Research and Development oversaw the pooling of 
 
138 See revised TRIPS waiver text of 21 May 2021 at https://www.keionline.org/wp-
content/uploads/W669Rev1.pdf 
139 ‘Brazil, India denounce Dutch generic drug seizure’ Reuters (30 Jan 2009)  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
davos-generic/brazil-india-denounce-dutch-generic-drug-seizure-idUSTRE50T27O20090130 
140 RM Hilty, PHD Batista, S Carls, D Kim, M Lamping and PR Slowinski, ‘Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual 




141 ‘Throughout 1943, penicillin production became the War Department’s No. 2 priority after the Manhattan 
Project’s drive to build a nuclear bomb’ as stated in ‘How a miracle drug changed the fight against infection 
during World War II’ The Washington Post (11 July 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-
consent/?next_url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.washingtonpost.com%2fhistory%2f2020%2f07%2f11%2fpenicillin-
coronavirus-florey-wwii-infection%2f; See also R Bud, Penicillin: Triumph and Tragedy (Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
142 J Love, ‘Buying out know-how to scale vaccine manufacturing’ Medium (20 March 2021) https://jamie-
love.medium.com/buying-know-how-to-scale-vaccine-manufacturing-586bdb304a36  
143 Ibid. 
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technology which resulted in a massive and rapid scale-up of penicillin production.144 
Indeed, only last year the US used the Defense Production Act (DPA), invoking national 
security concerns, in order to scale up domestic vaccine production in Operation 
Warpspeed.145  
In relation to incentives (or ‘carrots’), Jamie Love offers a way to ‘unlock’ know-how 
relevant to manufacturing – it could be ‘bought out’ by governments in certain 
circumstances.146 In terms of mandates (or ‘sticks’), the Brazilian Senate has passed a 
compulsory COVID-19 patent and know-how licensing Bill which may force 
pharmaceutical companies to share their trade secrets and data (if it proceeds to be 
approved by the Lower House).147 Further to this, German Member of the European 
Parliament Bernd Lange has proposed that the EU Commission ‘include a clause on 
technology transfer in future contracts … so that companies actively transfer knowledge, 
also to developing countries’.148 We note also that Art 73 of TRIPS provides grounds for 
the suspension of normal TRIPS powers and obligations in times of national emergency.  
At a practical level, we also observe that codification of such knowledge is possible 
in many cases. While corporate trade secrecy often entails tacit knowledge that is, in normal 
practice, not codified, and thus is difficult to transfer, regulatory requirements sometimes 
force originator/manufacturers to codify and submit some of this relevant tacit 
knowledge.149  
In terms of clinical data in the context of countries where data and marketing 
exclusivities apply, there have already been calls for a waiver of these exclusivities in order 
to meet public health needs, including, for example, in the context where a compulsory 
licence is issued.150 We concur and favour the introduction of a waiver on such data 
exclusivities (to support the wider TRIPS waiver) in regions/countries where this is 
relevant.  
As noted above, corresponding domestic legislation, such as the US Defense 
Production Act, can provide a legal basis for sharing trade secrets;151 relatedly, domestic 
legislation could also be employed in order to facilitate the sharing of regulatory data 
 
144 It is unclear how much choice the industry had in the context of penicillin, but it readily agreed; the carrot was 
likely the legal immunities the industry could expect to benefit from, namely freedom from anti-trust challenges: 
‘With government permission and exemption from anti-trust legislation, they [the 20 companies involved in 
manufacture] shared technology with each other and with academic institutions.’ R Bud, Penicillin: Triumph and 
Tragedy (Oxford University Press, 2007), 45. 
145 See details at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Operation-Warp-Speed/  
146 J Love, ‘Buying out know-how to scale vaccine manufacturing’ Medium (20 March 2021) https://jamie-
love.medium.com/buying-know-how-to-scale-vaccine-manufacturing-586bdb304a36 
147 See details at https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/brazilian-senate-passes-compulsory-covid-19-know-
how-licensing-bill and https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/brazil-senate-votes-to-suspend-patent-
protection-on-covid-19-vaccines/ar-BB1gcwye 
148 See Official Letter sent to the EU Commission by Lange and posted by him to social media 
https://twitter.com/berndlange/status/1394902774832373760  
149 S Parthasarathy, ‘Ensuring global access to COVID-19 vaccines’ Gerald Ford School of Government Policy Memo (21 
Jan 2021) 
https://fordschool.umich.edu/news/2021/policy-memo-parthasarathy-ensuring-global-access-covid-19-vaccines  
150 EFM ’t Hoen, P Boulet, B Baker, ‘Data exclusivity exceptions and compulsory licensing to promote generic 
medicines in the EU’ 10 Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice (2017) 19. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5490222/  
151 See details at https://www.fema.gov/disasters/defense-production-act  
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between the relevant medical authorities in one country and those of another.152 Sharing 
of such regulatory submissions (relevant to data exclusivity), which include codified tacit 
knowledge, would enable others to both increase production and solve follow-on 
problems regarding, for example, efficiency, speed, fixing bugs, meeting localised 
conditions and innovating to address variants. Such measures would not be entirely novel 
and would certainly not be inappropriate in an extraordinary pandemic situation. Greater 
sharing would enable would-be manufacturers to connect public IP knowledge (e.g., 
patents), including information which the larger scientific community needs in order to 
better understand the manufacture of biologics, with regulatory knowledge (data and 
codified know-how).  
In sum, given the extent of the public health crisis we face and the thicket of the 
patent – trade secret/undisclosed information interface, we must re-evaluate current IP 
framework and its effects, which are simply not adequate for addressing civilisational 
challenges such as COVID-19. Crucially, the legal negotiations over the TRIPS waiver 
offer a way to try to resolve these issues in the political-economic sphere (and may 
encourage greater industry support for voluntary sharing mechanisms).153 We must ask to 
what extent disclosure and sharing of information can be achieved, and how the waiver 
can contribute to a solution by either acting as a lever to encourage industry co-operation 
in non-exclusive, voluntary deals, and/or by putting down a comprehensive legal 
foundation within the global trading framework to also mandate knowledge sharing and 
participation in global measures, such as the WHO-led C-TAP initiative. Even before its 
negotiation and adoption, the TRIPS waiver proposal is already having a positive impact 
in this regard; for example, it has led to increased transparency about vaccine 
manufacturing.154 In light of growing and widespread pressure in the wake of the waiver 
proposal, it is logical that companies would prefer a controlled, voluntary transfer of 
information; the alternative could be to see all IP rights waived, even temporarily, which 
would occur if the broad language of the original/revised waiver proposal put forward by 
India and South Africa (which includes section 7, part II of TRIPS – undisclosed 
information) were retained in any eventual accepted text.155  
The recommendation of the WHO’s Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness 
and Response appears to envisage precisely this: utilising the waiver as leverage by legal 
 
152 R Li, J Wood, A Baskaran, S Neumann, El Graham, M Levenstein and I Sim, ‘Timely access to trial data in the 
context of a pandemic: the time is now’ 10 BMJ Open (2020) https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/10/10/e039326  
153 Even a waiver sceptic such Bostyn states that the TRIPS waiver proposal will likely have the beneficial effect of 
pushing pharmaceutical companies to conclude more voluntary agreements. He notes in his conclusion at page 
17 that the discourse of the IP waiver in the political sphere will ‘make them more willing to license out the 
manufacturing of the COVID-19 vaccines to third parties, which they have hitherto done only to a very limited 
extent’. Arguably, this well-made point undermines the narrative thrust of his paper, which is that seeking a waiver 
is not a good strategy – S Bostyn, ‘Why a Covid IP Waiver is not a good strategy’ (10 May 2021) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3843327  
154 P Erfani, LO Gostin and V Kerry, ‘Beyond a symbolic gesture: What’s needed to turn the IP waiver into Covid-
19 vaccines’ Stat News (19 May 2021) https://www.statnews.com/2021/05/19/beyond-a-symbolic-gesture-
whats-needed-to-turn-the-ip-waiver-into-covid-19-vaccines/  
155 See revised TRIPS waiver text of 21 May 2021 at https://www.keionline.org/wp-
content/uploads/W669Rev1.pdf 
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threat. As noted earlier, the Panel recommends that the WHO and WTO work together 
to seek voluntary agreement to facilitate technology transfer and voluntary licensing for 
COVID-19 vaccines; and in the absence of this agreement within 3 months, a TRIPS 
waiver should come into effect immediately.156 Currently, there is no legal incentive or 
mandate for key players to see this crisis as an opportunity to articulate a more equitable 
and ethical mode of practice of global solidarity. That is why the TRIPS waiver, rather 
than the (current) burdensome compulsory licensing system, is needed. The alternative is 
the status quo – nationalistic and opportunistic behaviour and the quest for ‘super profits’ 




DO COMPULSORY LICENCES PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
TRIPS WAIVER? 
 
A common argument which has been raised in opposition to the waiver proposal has been 
to suggest that since the WTO system already allows for compulsory licensing, there is no 
need for a waiver.158 It is true that compulsory licensing offers a potential alternative to 
allow third parties to use technologies covered by intellectual property rights in the absence 
of rights-holders’ permission. In cases of ‘a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use’ the TRIPS Agreement allows 
for the forgoing of the general requirement that there should first be an attempt to 
negotiate a voluntary licence with the IP rights holder before a compulsory licence (CL) is 
issued. The COVID-19 context would likely be viewed as one such emergency.159 Yet, as 
shown above, the fragmented and complex existing IP landscape – as highlighted in a 
recent network analysis study of mRNA vaccine-related patents160 – is a key reason why 
the existing system of compulsory licensing under TRIPS, and more generally the current 
‘TRIPS flexibilities’161 for public health, are not well suited to addressing vaccine needs 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
156 The Independent Panel, ‘COVID-19: Make it the Last Pandemic’ (May 2021) at 14 
https://theindependentpanel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/COVID-19-Make-it-the-Last-
Pandemic_final.pdf 
157 A term used by SII CEO Adar Poonawalla as quoted in ‘How Profitable is Adara Poonawalla’s Serum Institute?’ 
Business Today (14 May 2021) https://www.businesstoday.in/current/corporate/how-profitable-is-adar-
poonawalla-serum-institute/story/439018.html  
158 EFM ’t Hoen, ‘Covid-19 and the comeback of compulsory licensing’ Medicines Law and Policy (23 Mar 2020) 
https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2020/03/covid-19-and-the-come-back-of-compulsory-licensing/  
 (accessed 24th May 2021). 
159 A McMahon, ‘Global equitable access to vaccines, medicines and diagnostics for COVID-19: The role of patents 
as private governance’ 47 Journal of Medical Ethics (2021) 142. 
160 M Gaviria and B Kilic, ‘A network analysis of COVID-19 mRNA vaccine patents’ 39 Nature Biotechnology (2021) 
546. 
161 ‘TRIPS flexibilities’ is a frequently used phrase in the context of countries’ room for manoeuvre in terms of their 
domestic interpretation of TRIPS in pursuit of certain public policy goals such as enhancing access to medicines. 
They include, but are not necessarily limited to: (i) vague language of many of the TRIPS provisions, (ii) the 
declared objectives and principles (Articles 7 and 8) which contain positive language for LMICs, (iii) omissions 
(e.g., on new use patents) and immunities (e.g., the non-justiciability of exhaustion of rights regimes), (iv) the 
availability of public policy safeguards (such as compulsory licensing), exclusions and exceptions to rights – like 
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In a pandemic context, seeking to use compulsory licensing under the standard 
criteria provided for a CL in TRIPS, as a solution to achieving global equitable access to 
vaccines on the scale and timeline needed for COVID-19 has six significant drawbacks 
given the general requirements for a CL under TRIPS.162 The first is that a CL can only be 
applied on a product-by-product, and country-by-country basis. A blanket CL in all states 
for, for example, COVID-19 vaccines is not possible under TRIPS. Second, the WTO 
system sets down minimum criteria for a CL to be used in WTO states under Art 31 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, but national states can impose additional requirements for a CL, 
meaning the procedures for obtaining a CL at the national level can often be bureaucratic, 
uncertain and/or time consuming. Third, despite a CL being a flexibility allowed for by 
TRIPS, some states have traditionally been (understandably) reluctant to invoke the 
process for issuing a CL, including due to fears of challenge and/or of trade sanctions being 
imposed on them (which has happened in the past).163  
The fourth issue is that, as noted above, there are additional obstacles to the use of a 
CL for vaccines, including regulatory obstacles.164 For instance, as stated earlier, in some 
regions including the EU, there are additional protections for clinical trial data such as data 
and marketing exclusivities which mean that generic producers cannot use such data when 
seeking regulatory approval for a generic product during a certain period of time.165 This 
means that obtaining generic approval may not be possible in a timely manner for such 
products – this has proven to be a stumbling block against use of a CL in Europe.166 Such 
requirements may also impede the use of CLs for COVID-19 in some contexts. Fifth, 
when a CL is issued, the rights holder must be provided with adequate renumeration, and 
challenges can arise around what is ‘adequate’ in a pandemic context.167 Notably, in this 
and other contexts, negotiating with pharmaceutical companies can be challenging and 
subject to asymmetry of information and predatory delays. Sixth, Art 31(f) of TRIPS states 
that products made under a CL must be used ‘predominantly for supply of the domestic 
market’; however, because of changes introduced by Art 31 bis,168 in theory a CL for export 
and import is now possible for WTO states. Yet there are obstacles to the use of Art 31 
bis, including the fact that some countries/regions (such as the EU) have opted out of Art 
 
the Bolar (regulatory review) exemption, rendered permissible in conformity with an adopted WTO panel report, 
and (v) Article 73 security exceptions whose scope is somewhat unclear but may in fact be extremely broad.  
162 This reflects on arguments raised previously in A McMahon, ‘Global equitable access to vaccines, medicines and 
diagnostics for COVID-19: The role of patents as private governance’ 47 Journal of Medical Ethics (2021) 142. 
163 EFM ’t Hoen, J Veraldi, B Toebes, et al., ‘Medicine procurement and the use of flexibilities in the agreement on 
Trade-Related aspects of intellectual property rights, 2001–2016’ 96 Bull World Health Organ (2018) 85. A non-
exhaustive list of flexibilities under TRIPS (including use of compulsory licensing) and their use within the health 
context is available here: http://tripsflexibilities.medicineslaw andpolicy.org/ (Accessed 24th May 2021).  
164 EFM ’t Hoen, P Boulet, BK Baker, ‘Data exclusivity exceptions and compulsory licensing to promote generic 
medicines in the European Union: A proposal for greater coherence in European pharmaceutical legislation’ 
Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice (2017) 10 
165 Ibid. 
166 EFM ’t Hoen, J Veraldi, B Toebes, et al., ‘Medicine procurement and the use of flexibilities in the agreement on 
Trade-Related aspects of intellectual property rights, 2001–2016’ 96 Bull World Health Organ (2018) 85. 
167 H Wong, ‘The case for compulsory licensing during COVID-19’ 10 Journal of Global Health (2020)  
168 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. WTO Doc. WT/L/641 (Dec. 8,2005) (hereafter Article 31 bis) 













                        06/2021 
 
 28 
31 bis as importing members.169 On this, there have been calls, which we support, for 
HICs/regions who have opted out of this system to opt back in, given the risks posed by 
the COVID-19 context. 170  
Furthermore, the conditions for using Art 31 bis for states with limited manufacturing 
capacity are highly onerous, and there are limited incentives for third parties to assist in 
provision of products under a CL for export. Indeed, to date this provision has only ever 
been used effectively once, when Rwanda obtained access to generic HIV TriAvir by 
importing this from the Canadian company Apotex.171 However, even in that context, 
Rwanda notified the WTO Council of its intent to use this mechanism in July 2007, but 
did not obtain its first shipment of medicines until 15 months later, in 2008.172 Since the 
US announced support for the waiver in early May 2021, Bolivia has made a declaration 
to the WTO that it is seeking supply of vaccines from Canada under Art 31 bis (for 
compulsory licence), which is a welcome development. Yet Bolivia’s application also 
indicates, once again, the limits of Art 31 bis when applied in a rapidly evolving 
technological and heavily patented field. 173  
Thus, compulsory licensing under the TRIPS system has considerable drawbacks, 
including: the lack of detailed knowledge about the web of patents which may be applicable 
to any vaccine, inadequate information about manufacturing or regulatory processes, the 
terms of cross-licensing (because licence agreements are not disclosed to the public) and 
limited knowledge about the contents of the patent applications which may be relevant for 
a CL application as many are still unpublished by the relevant patent offices. Such issues 
make the effective use of CLs for vaccines very difficult in both the domestic and Art 31 
bis context. Bolivia’s WTO filing demonstrates poignantly that such a lack of transparency 
around applicable patents makes it difficult to determine which patents and patent 
applications are relevant for a CL process in the first place.174 Thus, for these reasons, in 
the context of seeking a timely global solution for vaccine equity in the COVID-19 
context, we argue that merely relying on compulsory licensing on its own under the 
 
169 For a list of opt-out countries, see WTO, ‘Annex and Appendix to the TRIPS Agreement (note 3) 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_annex_e.htm; see also A McMahon, ‘Global 
equitable access to vaccines, medicines and diagnostics for COVID-19: The role of patents as private governance’ 
47 Journal of Medical Ethics (2021) 142. 
170 See details at https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2020/04/never-say-never-why-the-high-income-countries-
that-opted-out-from-the-art-31bis-wto-trips-system-must-urgently-reconsider-their-decision-in-the-face-of-the-
covid-19-pandemic/  
171 H Hestermeyer, ‘Canadian-made Drugs for Rwanda: The First Application of the WTO Waiver on Patents and 
Medicines’ ASIL Insights (10 December 2007) https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/28/canadian-
made-drugs-rwanda-first-application-wto-waiver-patents-
and#:~:text=Article%2031%20of%20the%20TRIPS,within%20a%20reasonable%20period%20of  
172 B Anderson, ‘Better Access to Medicines: Why Countries are getting “Tripped” up and Not Ratifying Article 31 
Bis’ Case Western Reserve Journal of Law, Technology and the Internet (2010) 165. 
173 With specific reference to current mRNA vaccines see M Gaviria and B Kilic, ‘A network analysis of COVID-
19 mRNA vaccine patents’ 39 Nature Biotechnology (2021) 546. 
174 The Bolivian government states that it is not clear if the product for which a CL is sought is protected by patents 
in its territory: the matter is ‘To be determined’. Bolivia’s notification of its intent to use the Art. 31 bis CL 
mechanism states as a response to the category ‘¿Está(n) el/los producto(s) necesario(s) protegido(s) mediante 
patente en el territorio?’: ‘Por determinarse. En la medida en que se hayan solicitado u otorgado patentes para los 
productos necesarios, el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia tiene la intención de concederlicencias obligatorias, de 
conformidad con los artículos31 y 31bisdel Acuerdo sobre los ADPIC.’ 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=s:/IP/N/9BOL1.pdf&Open=True  
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existing TRIPS framework, in the absence of industry providing greater support for 
voluntary licensing measures, has significant limitations.  
It is also important to not make the error of viewing the TRIPS waiver and 
compulsory licensing as entirely an ‘either/or’ situation. It is possible to argue in favour of 
reciprocity between the two approaches. We note that COVID-19 has already resulted in 
some countries modifying compulsory licensing laws to make it easier for CLs to be used 
at the national level in the pandemic or in broader public health contexts.175 This is 
positive, and it is our view that all states should be encouraged to do similarly as soon as 
possible. Indeed, unlike in the past, today there may be greater state willingness for CLs to 
be used to address at least some issues of the COVID-19 pandemic because, as noted 
above, the TRIPS waiver has shifted the political balance in favour of CL use. On this, 
CLs may be particularly useful in the context of therapeutics, diagnostics and medical 
equipment – as these are typically easier to reverse-engineer in practice than vaccines are. 
Recent US support for a TRIPS waiver was accompanied by the use of permissive language 
on CLs (in the relevant US Trade Representative report).176 This is welcome: it should 
boost legal and operative measures in developing countries to protect public health and 
encourage use of CLs in the COVID-19 context. This would be yet another positive 
political impact of the TRIPS waiver.  
We favour the tandem pursuit of CLs (where specific state needs can be addressed) 
and the TRIPS waiver (to achieve universal benefits).177 It does not need to be an either/or 
approach. CLs may prove useful in some areas of health technology, and, as noted above, 
utilising CLs may now be less burdensome considering the positive US reaction to the 
TRIPS waiver proposal and associated USTR language on CLs. This is arguably another 
achievement flowing from the growing momentum and support behind the TRIPS waiver. 
Nonetheless, as we outlined in the previous section, a universal TRIPS waiver offers clear 
benefits that the mere use of CLs under TRIPS simply cannot achieve. The waiver is also 
a legal and political lever to encourage and mandate technology transfer and the sharing 
of trade secrets and other data such as industry participation in voluntary schemes like the 
C-TAP. In sum, the waiver offers a far wider-ranging proposition than what the mere use 







175 A McMahon, ‘Patents, access to health and COVID-19 – The role of compulsory and government-use licensing 
in Ireland’ 71 NILQ (2020) 331. 
176 Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), 2021 Special 301 Report (2021) at 34 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021%20Special%20301%20Report%20(final).pdf  
177 Indeed, if the waiver were adopted, this would clear the way for use of CL at a domestic level, as noted in JL 
Contreras, ‘US Support for a WTO Waiver of COVID-19 Intellectual Property – What Does it Mean?’ (7 May 
2021) https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/07/wto-waiver-intellectual-property-covid/  
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WHAT WILL THE IMPACT OF THE TRIPS WAIVER BE ON THE 
GLOBAL IP SYSTEM? 
 
The current discussion around the TRIPS waiver has exposed disagreements among 
academics and legal scholars about whether the waiver could jeopardise future ability to 
respond to other global challenges by weakening the incentives for pharmaceutical 
innovation.178 As we outline below, in order to understand this argument it must be 
considered from both sides of the patent bargain, in the context of the pandemic, and with 
reference to the history of the pharmaceutical industry in the pre- and post-TRIPS eras. 
 
ANALYSING THE ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIPS WAIVER WILL WEAKEN 
INNOVATION INCENTIVES  
 
The assumption that patents create positive incentives for innovation is oft stated, 
but it is actually highly contested within academic scholarship. An overview of general law 
and economics literature on the patent bargain offers neutral to negative support for such 
a claim.179 The patent bargain, which provides the utilitarian justification of patent rights, 
namely that a private monopoly right is justified for the public good, requires calculation 
of values that are difficult to quantify.180 Landes and Posner, in their economic analysis of 
IP law, remark: ‘[W]hether the benefits exceed the costs is impossible to answer with 
confidence on the basis of present knowledge.’181 In the context of the ongoing US House 
of Representatives Hearing on Unsustainable Drug Prices, James Love182 states that ‘there 
is no connection between the incentives needed to induce investments in biomedical 
innovation and the ultimate cost of the incentives’, effectively delinking patent incentives 
from biomedical innovation.183 
Even if one accepts the rhetoric of ‘IP as innovation incentives’ generally, our position 
is that it makes very little sense in the extraordinary context of COVID-19-related IP, 
especially in relation to patent and trade secrets on vaccines. This is because the COVID-
19 vaccine market has been created to a large degree by public subsidies. Advance market 
orders by individual governments and COVAX have de-risked vaccine developments to 
such a degree in this context that it makes very little sense to privatise the fruits of public 
 
178 RM Hilty, PHD Batista, S Carls, D Kim, M Lamping and PR Slowinski, ‘Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual 




179 F Lévêque and Y Ménière, ‘Patents and Innovation: Friends or Foes?’ UC Berkeley Recent Work (2007) 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2w8605xg; A Jaffe and J Lerner, Innovation and its Discontents (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007); J Bessen and M Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put 
Innovators at Risk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
180 M Biagioli, ‘Weighing intellectual property: Can we balance the social costs and benefits of patenting?’ 57 History 
of Science (2019) 140 – doi:10.1177/0073275318797787. 
181 W Landes and R Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard University Press, 2003) 310 (at 
n 5), quoted in M Biagioli (2018) n 154.  
182 Director, Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) https://www.keionline.org/jamie  
183 J Love, ‘KEI statement in House hearing on Unsustainable Drug Prices (Part III)’ KEI (19 May 2021) 
https://www.keionline.org/36222 
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funding with the additional ‘incentive’ of private monopoly rights. In fact, as we note 
above, there is a tangible risk that privately held IP monopolies and profit maximisation 
strategies may actually create the wrong incentives in the short-term in a pandemic context, 
prioritising the production and distribution of HICs’ booster doses rather than first doses 
for LMICs.184 Given that vaccine markets cannot be understood as entirely privately 
ordered markets, we must also acknowledge that in the medium to long term they may 
respond differently to IP incentives, which operate with a forward-looking timeframe. In 
the past, the market has not been very good at responding to calls for pandemic 
preparedness, in part because of the way such incentives are structured.185  
Therefore, and despite what some commentators argue, in the context of COVID-
19 vaccines we are not in a ‘normal’ incentive/reward situation.186 The argument that the 
COVID-limited, temporary TRIPS IP waiver will de-incentivise R&D in all other areas of 
science/technology (where IP protections remain unaffected) is thus unconvincing.187 
Defenders of the status quo in the COVID-19 context tend to under-state the risks of the 
current pandemic for global public health and over-state the risk to the overall IP system 
from the temporary COVID-focused IP waiver proposal. In fact, as we note above, there 
is a danger that the IP system could create the wrong incentives if the market is left to 
regulate such issues. Patents are not only valued for monopoly pricing power but also as 
strategic and financial assets.188 The forward-looking speculative value of patents for 
maintaining pricing and market monopoly explains the paradoxical arguments of the 
waiver opponents: they argue that the waiver will not change a thing, yet they also argue 
that it will disincentivise their operation in the future.189  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING HOW INCENTIVES HAVE OPERATED IN THE 
PRE- AND POST-TRIPS ERAS 
 
An undifferentiated and uncritical understanding of patents as incentives neglects the 
fact that the patent bargain plays out differently in various nation states, so that it is difficult 
to apply the same IP justification across varied jurisdictions. The incentive narrative may 
make sense in a HIC domestic system (e.g., German or UK) or for different inventive 
 
184 N Triggle, ‘UK orders another 60m from Pfizer’ BBC (28 April 2021) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
56921018  
185 See J&J CEO statement at ‘Researchers are racing to make a coronavirus vaccine: will it help?’ New York Times 
(28 January 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/health/coronavirus-vaccine.html  
186 RM Hilty, PHD Batista, S Carls, D Kim, M Lamping and PR Slowinski, ‘Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual 
Property: Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 7 May 2021’ (7 May 
2021)https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/2021_05_07_Position_statement_C
ovid_IP_waiver.pdf   
187 S Thambisetty, ‘Why Patent Law Doesn't Do Innovation Policy’ LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 20/2013 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2328173  
188 HY Kang, ‘Patents as Assets: Intellectual Property Rights as Market Subjects and Objects’ in K Birch & F 
Muniesa (Eds.), Assetization. Turning Things into Assets in Technoscientific Capitalism (MIT Press, 2020) 75–95.  
189 G Chazan, E Solomon, H Kuchler and J Brundsen, ‘Angela Merkel rejects US move to waive patents on vaccines’ 
Financial Times (6 May 2021) https://www.ft.com/content/76a05a85-b83c-4e36-b04d-7f44f63e57b0  
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fields in science and technology.190 Yet we must not ignore the fact that transnational IP 
law fails to account for differential national socio-economic conditions in different states, 
including highly varied capacities to acquire and absorb technologies from elsewhere, 
whether through foreign direct investment, licensing or other means. Indeed, TRIPS was 
not designed to accommodate meaningfully such variation, despite some favourable 
language in Articles 7191 and 66.192 
As a result, the IP-dominant framing of innovation has contributed to both the 
systematic inability to meet local needs and the underdevelopment of vaccine production 
in LMICs.193 In normal times, vaccine markets in HICs tend to be small, and are akin to 
other instances of chronic underfunding, such as orphan drugs.194 Vaccines for LMICs are 
usually procured and delivered as public goods at low cost, and are not typically profitable 
when compared to medicines with recurring treatment costs.195 There are prominent 
examples of market failures with respect to producing vaccines for LMICs.196 Failures also 
occurred in the emergency responses to Zika and Ebola.197 Precisely because the 
conventional IP incentives have so far failed to meet the needs of the poor with respect 
to some of the most lethal diseases in the world, such as malaria, we must resist calls to 
defend uncritically such incentives now, in a global pandemic.198  
 
190 RM Hilty, PHD Batista, S Carls, D Kim, M Lamping and PR Slowinski, ‘Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual 




191 Art 7 TRIPS states: ‘The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.’ 
192 Art 66, TRIPS states:  
 
‘1. In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country Members, their economic, 
financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable technological base, 
such Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 
5, for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under paragraph 1 of Article 65. The 
Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed country Member, accord 
extensions of this period; 2. Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.’ 
 
193 A Irwin, ‘How COVID spurred Africa to Plot a Vaccine Revolution’ Nature (21 April 2021) 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01048-1 
194 AS Rutschman, ‘The Mosaic of Coronavirus Vaccine Development: Systemic Failures in Vaccine Innovation’ 
21 Saint Louis University School of Law – Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2020)  
195 AS Monto, ‘Vaccines and Antiviral Drugs in Pandemic Preparedness’ 12 Emerging Infectious Diseases (2006) 55. 
196 DC Kaslow, S Black , DE Bloom , M Datla , D Salisbury & R Rappuoli, ‘Vaccine candidates to poorer nations 
are going to waste’ 564 Nature (27 December 2018) 334 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07758-3  
197 Supra fn 6; With respect to the Ebola vaccine, ‘Canadian government scientists drove the development of rVSV-
ZEBOV, from laboratory bench to a commercial grade product for use in clinical trials, while private sector 
partners failed to substantively advance development in the years leading up to the [2014–15] epidemic’ as stated 
in M Herder, JE Graham and R Gold, ‘From discovery to delivery: public sector development of the rVSV-
ZEBOV Ebola vaccine.’ 7 Journal of Law and the Biosciences (2020) 1–14; See also ‘Ebola outbreak: why has “big 
pharma” failed deadly virus victims?’ The Independent (7 September 2014) https://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/health-and-families/health-news/ebola-outbreak-big-pharma-failed-victims-why-9716615.html   
198 J Lezaun and CM Montgomery, ‘The Pharmaceutical Commons: Sharing and Exclusion in Global Health Drug 
Development’ 40 Science, Technology, & Human Values (2015) 3. doi:10.1177/0162243914542349  
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Rather we should acknowledge that as innovation incentives, IP rights have, at best, 
globally uneven results. Economic studies demonstrate that, as internationally structured, 
they cannot serve differential international public interests equally well because there is 
insufficient space for countries to tailor their design domestically to fit local needs and 
conditions.199 Indeed, there is much data to support claims that due to TRIPS, developing 
countries’ long-standing position as ‘importers’ of technology may become permanent,200 
ensuring that their ability to participate in the global knowledge economy remains 
marginal. This context drives much of the international opposition to the present status 
quo of what may be deemed ‘IP maximalism’.  
The rhetoric of IP maximalism around the TRIPS Agreement among net exporter 
nations and transnational corporations has often taken on moralistic and natural property 
rights hues. Yet, IP rights are historical monopolies that have become socially constructed 
rights: they are not ‘discovered’ or natural property rights.201 They are not held in 
perpetuity and provided by state(s) in return for a quid pro quo to meet certain innovation 
incentives (though as we note above, these incentives operate unevenly). During the 19th 
and 20th centuries several major states, including, for example, the Netherlands, abolished 
patent rights for a period in order to build up domestic industry; while others deliberately 
weakened IP rights to enhance domestic technological capacities.202 Several countries, 
including those which now feature leading pharmaceutical corporations, were for a long 
time hesitant to allow medicines to be patentable:  
 
‘Pharmaceutical products only became patentable in France in 1960, in Ireland in 
1964, in Germany in 1968, in Japan in 1976, in Switzerland in 1977, in Italy and 
Sweden in 1978, and Spain in 1992. Interestingly, a few developing countries acted 
in the reverse direction. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s Brazil and 
India passed laws to exclude pharmaceuticals as such from patentability (as well as 
 
199 Sanjaya Lall’s research finds ample evidence that ‘the need for IPRs varies with the level of development’. Based 
in part on the work of Keith Maskus, Lall states:  
 
‘Many rich countries used weak IPR protection in their early stages of industrialisation to develop local 
technological bases, increasing protection as they approached the leaders. Econometric cross-section 
evidence suggests that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between the strength of IPRs and income 
levels. The intensity of IPRs first falls with rising incomes, as countries move to slack IPRs to build local 
capabilities by copying, then rises as they engage in more innovative effort. The turning point is $7,750 per 
capita in 1985 prices ..., a fairly high level of income for the developing world.’ 
 
S Lall with M Albaladejo, ‘Indicators of the Relative Importance of IPRs in Developing Countries’ Issues Paper no. 
3, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development, Geneva (2003) (though a 
relatively old study, new evidence to disprove this general thesis is lacking). 
200 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy: 
Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002). For an article citing and commenting on the various 
arguments about this, see G Dutfield, ‘The Limits of Substantive Patent Law Harmonization’ in RL Okediji and 
MA Bagley (Eds.), Patent Law in Global Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2014) 127–146. 
201 M Biagioli, ‘Patent Republic’ 73 Social Research (2006) 1129. See also F Machlup and E Penrose, ‘The Patent 
Controversy in the Nineteenth Century’ 10 Journal of Economic History (1950) 1. 
202 G Dutfield, That High Design of Purest Gold: A Critical History of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1880–2020 (World 
Scientific Publishing, 2020). 
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processes to manufacture them in Brazil’s case). TRIPS compliance, though, has 
required these countries to change direction again. India finally allowed drugs to be 
patented, albeit with some continuing restrictions, in 2005.’203  
 
The strong underlying features of the current Indian and Brazil pharmaceutical 
industries can to some extent be traced to this pre-TRIPS period, when patent rights were 
weak or severely limited.204 By contrast, post-TRIPS, LMICs have been hindered from 
developing pharmaceutical capacity due to strong IP rights and a lack of technology 
transfer.205 However, when IP rights are couched in ‘property’ terms, often naturalised 
without a regard for their overall social justification, this important history is lost.206 Thus, 
different understandings of IP rights – as historically contingent or as near-absolute 
property rights – appear to be one of the fault lines in the academic debate on the scope 
of the waiver.207 
IP maximalist views are often expressed in the form of nationalistic complaints of 
other countries ‘stealing’ ‘our’ innovations.208 In a recent interview the Curevac investor 
Friedrich von Bohlen remarked that US support for a TRIPS waiver is an attempt to 
disrupt the German firms Curevac and BioNTech:  
 
‘Germany’s post-war constitution says that human life is inviolable, I’d say the same 
about intellectual property … If the firms were all American, I don’t think we’d 
have had this proposal.’209  
 
Aside from the highly problematic – morally and legally – equation of the right to human 
life with rights to intellectual property,210 this statement also ignores the fact that the 
current mRNA technology is based on Hungarian, Japanese and American scientists’ 
research in different countries, and is the product of cumulative, cross-national 
 
203 G Dutfield and U Suthersanen, Dutfield and Suthersanen on Global Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar, 2020), 
172. 
204 Ibid. 
205 See generally G Krikorian and A Kapczynski (Eds.), Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property (Zone Press, 
2010). See also S Ragavan and A Vanni (Eds.), Intellectual Property Law and Access to Medicine: TRIPS Agreement, 
Health, and Pharmaceuticals (Routledge, 2021). 
206 GS Alexander, EM Penalver, J Singer and L Underkuffler, ‘A statement of progressive property’ 94 Cornell Law 
Review (2009) 743. 
207 RM Hilty, PHD Batista, S Carls, D Kim, M Lamping and PR Slowinski, ‘Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual 
Property: Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 7 May 2021’ (7 May 
2021) at 3 
https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/2021_05_07_Position_statement_Covid_I
P_waiver.pdf  
208 S Oddi ‘TRIPS – Natural Rights and a Polite Form of Economic Imperialism’ 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law (1996) 415. 
209 D Scally, ‘Curevac investor sees bright future for German vaccine maker’ The Irish Times (20 May 2021) 
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/health-pharma/curevac-investor-sees-bright-future-for-german-vaccine-
maker-1.4568758  
210 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on universal affordable vaccination for COVID-19, 
international cooperation and intellectual property E/C.12/2021/1 which states: ‘[B]usiness entities should also refrain 
from invoking intellectual property rights in a manner that is inconsistent with the right of every person to access 
a safe and effective vaccine for COVID-19 or to the right of States to exercise TRIPS flexibilities.’ 
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investigations.211 In addition, the claim that the TRIPS waiver may result in certain states 
losing a technological and competitive lead, as voiced by the pharmaceutical industry, 
needs to be understood in this context: it is an admission of the present benefits that some 
countries and companies enjoy as a result of the TRIPS system.212 These are hard to cede. 
Nonetheless, we are in an extraordinary situation; consequently, extraordinary measures,213 
such as the TRIPS waiver, ought not to be viewed as disproportionate to global needs.214  
 
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ‘PATENT BARGAIN’: DO THE COVID-19 PATENTS SERVE 
THE GLOBAL PUBLIC? 
 
Looking to the other side of the ‘patent bargain’, we argue that the public good that 
transnational patent law needs to serve, particularly in a pandemic situation, must be a 
global public good.215 On production and price, this side of the bargain has not been 
served well. In relation to production, the current IP protections, coupled with different 
regulatory approvals, have resulted in an oligopolistic market, dominated at present by a 
small number of vaccine makers, including: Pfizer/BioNTech, AstraZeneca/Oxford, 
Johnson & Johnson, Moderna, Curevac, as well as Sputnik (Russia), Sinovac (China) and 
Covaxin (India).216 As we explore in the next sub-section, many of them have refused 
offers by experienced producers, such as Teva, to collaborate by assisting in manufacturing 
to produce more vaccines.217 It is not surprising that this small number of manufacturers 
with growing, but still relatively limited, voluntary licensing arrangements have struggled 
to meet the need to vaccinate the world against COVID-19. These monopolies appear to 
 
211 D Crow, ‘How mRNA became a vaccine game-changer’ Financial Times (13 May 2021) 
https://www.ft.com/content/b2978026-4bc2-439c-a561-a1972eeba940  
212 PhRMA, ‘PhRMA Statement on the WTO TRIPS IP Waiver’ (May 2021) https://www.phrma.org/Press-
Release/PhRMA-Statement-on-WTO-TRIPS-Intellectual-Property-Waiver (‘handing over American 
innovations to countries looking to undermine our leadership in biomedical discovery’). 
213 We acknowledge that there are different conceptions of proportionality, some of which are better suited to 
understanding intended and unintended, domestic and cross-national consequences of the application of the 
rules under the TRIPS agreement. Our argumentation is supported by constructions of proportionality that 
provide resources for analysing ends and means, rather than narrower constructions of ‘balancing’ options. To 
claim the TRIPS waiver is proportionate, is to claim a cumulative view of historic and ahistoric factors of both 
positive and negative effects to evaluate moral weight or permissibility of a chosen act. See for instance M Luteran 
‘The Lost Meaning of Proportionality’ in Huscroft, Miller and Webber Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, 
Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 21-42 
214 On proportionality analysis, it is worth recalling that under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, IP rights are qualified rights, not absolute rights – see J Griffiths and L 
McDonagh, ‘Fundamental Rights and European Intellectual Property Law – The Case of Art 17(2) of the EU 
Charter’ in C Geiger (Ed.), Constructing European IP: Achievements and New Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2013) 75–93. 
215 On the need to conceive of the ‘public’ in intellectual property law’s narrative as a ‘global public’: HY Kang, 
‘Patent capital in the covid-19 pandemic’ Critical Legal Thinking blog (9 February 2021) 
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2021/02/09/patent-capital-in-the-covid-19-pandemic-critical-intellectual-
property-law/  
216 There are several other vaccine candidates in various stages of trial, as shown in ‘Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker’ 
The New York Times (updated 21 May 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/science/coronavirus-
vaccine-tracker.html  
217 A Furlong, ‘Big vaccine makers reject offers to help produce more jabs’ Politico (14 May 2021) 
https://www.politico.eu/article/vaccine-producers-reject-offers-to-make-more-jabs/  
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be operating contrary to the global public interest in a pandemic, and as such, there should 
be incentives and mandates for new competitors to enter the market to increase 
production of a scarce good.  
On price, as noted above, the current IP legal order upholds a system whereby 
LMICs, such as South Africa, Bangladesh and Uganda have reportedly been charged a 
higher price than HICs for vaccines.218 On pricing, Hilty et al. state: ‘In the abstract, there 
was certainly a risk of excessive prices when the vaccines were still under development. 
Such risk should have been addressed by governments in the framework of the contracts 
subsidising research on vaccines …’219  
It is true that, despite significant public subsidies and effective de-risking of COVID-
19 vaccines through advance market orders, governments have not taken an ownership 
interest in the IP or demanded, for example, a royalty in the private profit that these 
subsidies yield.220 Ideally, contractual clauses in, for example, public funding agreements 
providing for developing underlying technologies related to COVID-19 vaccines should 
have been adopted, and should have built in affordability and non-exclusive use clauses 
for any downstream IP arising from such research and development. For future vaccines, 
we would strongly advocate that government investment and academic partnerships be 
equipped to include such clauses and to enforce them.  
Nonetheless, the argument of Hilty et al. is offered on the basis of hindsight, with a 
lack of critical analysis of the link between IP and pricing power, and fails to offer an 
adequate solution for present (and future) pandemic situations.221 Inequalities of pricing 
and distribution are matters of grave concern that must not be minimised or explained 
away as if they do not relate to intellectual property law. To portray the question of vaccine 
affordability as a matter of private contractual choices is to selectively ignore that a patent 
right bestows the exclusionary right and, hence, the power of monopoly pricing on the 
patent holder, which affects how such contracts are negotiated asymmetrically.222 From a 
pragmatic and ethical perspective, our key goal at this time must be to suggest a way 
forward in light of the position we are now in rather than defending lex lata that has shown 
its fatal limitations. As access to medicines campaigners and patent scholars have pointed 
out in many different ways, intellectual property is the fundamental structure that underlies 
 
218 C Paun and A Furlong, ‘Poorer countries hit with higher price tag for Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine’ Politico (22 
February 2021) https://www.politico.eu/article/astrazeneca-vaccine-cost-higher-in-poorer-countries-
coronavirus/  
219 RM Hilty, PHD Batista, S Carls, D Kim, M Lamping and PR Slowinski, ‘Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual 
Property: Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 7 May 2021’ (7 May 
2021) at 3 
https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/2021_05_07_Position_statement_Covid_I
P_waiver.pdf  
220 P Patnaik and HY Kang, ‘The “Patent Bargain”, Public Good & COVID19’ Healthpolicy Watch News (26 April 
2021) https://healthpolicy-watch.news/the-patent-bargain-public-good-covid-19/  
221 RM Hilty, PHD Batista, S Carls, D Kim, M Lamping and PR Slowinski, ‘Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual 
Property: Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 7 May 2021’ (7 May 
2021) at 3 
https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/2021_05_07_Position_statement_Covid_I
P_waiver.pdf 
222 O Dyer, ‘Covid-19: Countries are learning what others paid for vaccines’ BMJ (29 Jan 2021) 
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and enables such inequities, because it gives IP holders monopoly rights to control the use 
of underlying technologies.223  
We cannot divorce the layering of intellectual property rights, exclusivity protections 
around regulatory data, and the legal construction of excessive incentives from pricing; we 
cannot distinguish a culture of trade secrecy from absent transparency; we cannot rely on 
the free market to provide equitable distribution of vaccines globally any more than we 
relied on the free market to fund the necessary R&D or bear the whole risk of developing 
such vaccines in the first place. It is vital that rather than critiquing the TRIPS waiver 
proposal in legal formalistic terms, we locate it (and other current proposals) within their 
broader social, economic and political context. We must ground such proposals in the 
reality that each day that we do not have global equitable access to vaccines, the health, 
economic and social implications of COVID-19 will worsen, and in effect, more lives will 
be lost. To achieve global equity in vaccine access, we must scrutinise IP law as it operates 
alongside other legal/regulatory protections/systems and find solutions in tandem with 
addressing excessive pricing, lack of transparency and inequitable distribution. Hence, it is 
vital in this context that we as IP scholars work together in tackling the entrenched 
inequalities of the global economy, which the IP system reinforces. These have been 
evident in TRIPS since its inception.224 Rather than narrowly confining legal interpretation 
to existing legal clauses in TRIPS that have proven to be woefully inadequate in times of 
pandemic need, we ought to use our knowledge to propose alternative approaches to the 
current crisis, as the existing legal status quo is contributing to disastrous moral and 
political consequences of vaccine injustice.  
This illustrates an important point: the TRIPS waiver – indeed TRIPS itself – is not 
only legal, but also political. To view the waiver proposal solely in legal formalist terms is 
to make a categorical error.225 The history of both the TRIPS negotiations and the 2001 
Doha Declaration process demonstrates how IP law cannot be separated from global 
political economy and broader concerns of public interest.226 The TRIPS waiver proposal 
carries with it a unique resonance in the political-economic sphere. The change in 
discourse around IP which the waiver discussions are causing has the ability to bring 
greater clarity to the overall political legitimacy of IP law, and potentially shift the way 
domestic public health concerns can be strengthened against IP monopolies, including on 
the issue of pricing. There are a range of ways, from encouraging greater transparency to 
boosting production volume, that the TRIPS waiver, and attendant discussions, could have 
 
223 KC Shadlen, Coalitions and Compliance: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin America (Oxford 
University Press, 2017); A McMahon, ‘Biotechnology, Health and Patents as Private Governance Tools: The 
Good, the Bad and the Potential for Ugly?’ Intellectual Property Quarterly (2020) 161. 
224 S Oddi, ‘TRIPS – Natural Rights and a Polite Form of Economic Imperialism’ 29 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law (1996) 415. 
225 RM Hilty, PHD Batista, S Carls, D Kim, M Lamping and PR Slowinski, ‘Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual 
Property: Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 7 May 2021’ (7 May 
2021) 
https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/2021_05_07_Position_statement_Covid_I
P_waiver.pdf   
226 SK Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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a beneficial impact on the pricing of vaccines. In this regard, David Malpass, World Bank 
president, suggests the creation of a mandatory database about vaccine price and volume 




BUILDING PRODUCTIVE AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY IN BOTH HICS 
AND LMICS: TOWARDS LONG-TERM AND SUSTAINABLE VACCINE 
SUPPLIES 
 
One of the arguments raised against the TRIPS waiver proposal is that it will not help to 
alleviate the current vaccine shortage because it will take a long time to build local 
manufacturing capacity in LMICs; and in the meantime, existing HIC/LMIC facilities may 
be at, or near, capacity.228 Both of these points require unpacking. On the first – building 
new LMIC capacity – it is true that some new investments in LMICs’ production would 
not have immediate impact. It could take some months before vaccine manufacture can 
begin at entirely new or vastly repurposed facilities. Yet, other factories can be brought up 
to speed much more readily.229 For example, it is evident that in India the potential exists 
to scale up manufacturing capacity at several factories.230 The country has up to 21 vaccine 
facilities, both private- and public-sector funded, many with the existing ability to export 
vaccines to meet the demands of UN agencies.  
On the notion that there is no spare HIC/LMIC production capacity, this is 
contested. Companies in both HICs and LMICs – Canada (Biolyse), Israel (Teva), 
Denmark (Bavarian Nordic) and Bangladesh (Incepta) – have offered manufacturing 
capacity and were rebuffed and/or were unable to obtain a licence.231 That such HIC and 
LMIC capacity offers have not been taken up goes against what many industry sources, 
and even some IP commentators, have argued in recent weeks and months – that the 
appropriate ‘spare’ facilities do not exist elsewhere, and that new capacity could not be 
 
227 G Tett, ‘How radical transparency can help vaccinate the world’ Financial Times (15 May 2021). 
https://www.ft.com/content/c2ba2620-1785-434f-a574-7d54036f8182  
228 International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, ‘Towards Vaccinating the World – 
Landscape of Current Covid-19 Supply Chain and Manufacturing Capacity, Potential Challenges, Initial 
Responses, and Possible “Solution Space” – A Discussion Document’ (embargoed and released on 9 March 2021) 
https://www.ifpma.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Summit_Landscape_Discussion_Document.pdf. See 
also H Kuchler, ‘Will a Suspension of Covid Vaccine Patents Lead to More Jabs?’ Financial Times (6 May 2021) 
https://www.ft.com/content/b0f42409-6fdf-43eb-96c7-d166e090ab99   
229 For an overview of potential manufacturing sites that could be used to upscale COVID-19 vaccine production, 
see details provided by KEI at https://www.keionline.org/covid-19-vaccine-manufacturing-capacity 
230 P Rajan and M Neelakantan, ‘Scaling Up Vaccine Production’ The Hindu (13 April 2021) 
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/scaling-up-vaccine-production/article34304767.ece  
231 N Asgari, ‘Teva says vaccine makers have not taken its offer to help produce jabs’ Financial Times (28 April 2021) 
https://www.ft.com/content/4c72242f-fb8b-4c1c-b19e-f5c199b8e3a7; A Furlong, ‘US Shift of Vaccines 
Embarrasses Europe before India Summit’ Politico (6 May 2021) https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-
vaccine-patent-europe-united-states-joe-biden-india-summit/; J Oaten, ‘Vaccine Makers Say Coronavirus Could 
Be Stopped around the Globe in Months Rather than Years. Here’s How’ ABC News (19 March 2021) 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-20/how-we-end-the-covid-pandemic-around-the-world-in-
months/13260178 
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built for years.232 Despite the fact that the pandemic is not going to be over anytime soon 
– and that for it to be brought to an end global equitable vaccine access is vital – time is 
being lost by not accepting such voluntary offers and maximising co-operation for 
COVID-19 vaccine production globally. 
It has also been claimed that it is risky for vaccines to be produced in countries where 
intellectual property rights are ‘weak’ on the basis that the resulting vaccines may not be 
genuine or safe.233 Such claims appear to attempt to equate intellectual property rights with 
product quality. However, an IP right is not related to the quality of the underlying 
technology or product – these are entirely separate issues.234 Moreover, decades of 
examples prove otherwise in the vaccine context.235 For instance, Tamiflu was produced 
safely and successfully in a short space of time in India in 2005 despite claims that it 
involved such a complex process that could not be easily replicated.236 Similarly, Indian 
company Shanta Biotechnics produced a reliable and safe recombinant hepatitis B vaccine 
in 2009.237 Last year, Hetero and CIPLA produced Remdesivir in India after similar claims 
about safety fears and lack of biologics manufacturing competences were made.238 
Assertions that it would take ‘four years’ to build reliable pharmaceutical capacity in a 
country like Bangladesh are, quite simply, inaccurate (see the example of Incepta above).239 
In fact, a study involving vaccine makers and their supply to Gavi, a private–public vaccine 
alliance, found that transnational IP rights impede new manufacturers from entering and 
competing in the market rather than such manufacturers being held back by an inherent 
lack of manufacturing and technological capability.240  
There has been a related claim that the global shortage of raw materials worldwide is 
more to blame than intellectual property rights for the current lack of COVID-19 vaccine 
 
232 H Kuchler, ‘Will a Suspension of Covid Vaccine Patents Lead to More Jabs?’ Financial Times (6 May 2021) 
https://www.ft.com/content/b0f42409-6fdf-43eb-96c7-d166e090ab99  
233 S Gottlieb, ‘Covid Lessons from Bush’s Effort Against AIDS’ Wall Street Journal (28 March 2021). 
234 M Llewelyn, ‘Schrodinger's Cat: An Observation on Modern Patent Law’ in P Drahos (Ed.), Death of Patents 
(Lawtext Publishing, 2005). 
235 There are several key examples in Brazil, China and India as outlined in RG Douglas and VB Samant, ‘The 
Vaccine Industry’ 41 Plotkin's Vaccines (2018) – doi:10.1016/B978-0-323-35761-6.00004-3. 
236 T Amin, ‘The Folly of Hoarding Knowledge in the COVID-19 Age: Let Vaccine Producers in Poor Countries 
Help End the Pandemic’ Foreign Affairs (29 Jan 2021) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-01-
29/folly-hoarding-knowledge-covid-19-age 
237 J Chakma, H Masum, K Perampaladas, J Heys and PA Singer, ‘Indian vaccine innovation: the case of Shantha 
Biotechnics’ Globalization and Health 7 (2011) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3110116/  
238 ‘Remdesivir: Five Indian and Pakistani firms to make drug to “fight coronavirus”’ BBC (14 May 2020) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-52659052; ‘How secret deals could keep a COVID-19 
drug out of reach for millions’ Los Angeles Times (1 July 2020) https://www.latimes.com/world-
nation/story/2020-07-01/gilead-patent-limits-access-to-covid-19-drug-remdesivir  
239 See comment of Professor Sir Robin Jacob in H Kuchler, ‘Will a suspension of Covid vaccine patents lead to 
more jabs?’ Financial Times (6 May 2021) https://www.ft.com/content/b0f42409-6fdf-43eb-96c7-d166e090ab99. 
Contrast this with the offer of Bangladeshi company Incepta, as noted in ‘Countries Call on Drug Companies to 
Share Vaccine Know-how’ The Independent (1 March 2021) https://www.independent.co.uk/news/countries-call-
on-drug-companies-to-share-vaccine-knowhow-european-union-who-countries-vaccine-bangladesh-
b1809054.html  
240 S Chandrasekharan, T Amin, J Kim, E Furrer, A-C Matterson, N Schwalbe and A Nguyen, ‘Intellectual property 
rights and challenges for development of affordable human papillomavirus, rotavirus and pneumococcal vaccines: 
Patent landscaping and perspectives of developing country vaccine manufacturers’ 33 Vaccine (2015) 6366. 
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supply.241 On this, a recent open letter by Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla, published in part as 
a response to the US announcement of support for a TRIPS wavier proposal, is relevant. 
In this letter Bourla makes clear that the problem of vaccine supply is not one of building 
capacity and converting facilities (notably, mRNA vaccine capacity was built in a matter of 
months in 2020). Instead, he argues that shortages of raw material and supply chain 
components are the real problems.242 Bourla’s point thereby disproves the claim, discussed 
above, that it would take years to build up vaccine production capacity. Yet, in focusing 
on materials and components, Bourla fails to acknowledge that material and component 
shortages are not unrelated to bottlenecks created by an oligopolistic market, featuring too 
little standardisation, and amid an existing patent thicket. Vaccine technology components 
range from the mundane to the sophisticated, and there are many different trajectories of 
IP that may be implicated, including in the logistics of distribution.243 For example, plastic, 
single-use bioreactor bags have been scarce due to the global dependency on a few 
suppliers for these materials; crucially, there are currently 2800 patents that cover them, 
making entering the market as a new supplier onerous.244 The TRIPS waiver, proposed by 
India and South Africa in October 2020, and revised in May 2021,245 would apply not just 
to vaccine end products but also, potentially, to mechanical equipment and components; 
moreover, international negotiations over the waiver could be the springboard for co-
ordinating the global supply of ingredients efficiently.246  
In fact, Article 66.2 of TRIPS obliges governments in developed countries to provide 
incentives to ‘enterprises and institutions’ to enable technology transfer and a ‘sound and 
viable technological base’. The reluctance to share not just in the end products (including 
drugs or vaccines) but the underlying technology transfer has been a consistent failure of 
the TRIPS settlement and has arguably prolonged the capacity of a small number of large 
companies to manipulate artificial scarcity globally.247  
It is true, and we readily acknowledge, that the manufacturing processes for the 
COVID-19 vaccines can be complex and varied depending on the type of vaccine 
involved; delays in the supply of materials can also create bottlenecks; and successful 
 
241 A Bourla, ‘Today I Sent this Letter to Have a Candid Conversation with our Colleagues about the Drivers of 
COVID-19 Access and Availability’ Open Letter published on LinkedIn on 7 May 2021 
https://t.co/kkk2NbtkAO?amp=1 (accessed 24th May 2021) 
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production requires tacit know-how. The recent wasteful production at a US factory 
manufacturing the Johnson & Johnson vaccine demonstrates the reality of these 
challenges.248 These are all the more reasons to enhance global collaboration on vaccine 
manufacture for COVID-19 and to establish more production sites around the world so 
that sudden shortfalls in one can be made up for in others. Merely repeating claims that 
LMICs do not have the suitable productive facilities masks the root problem: not enough 
productive capacity has been built or is being built right now. Despite the pandemic, 
vaccine makers and pharmaceutical companies who hold relevant rights over COVID-19 
vaccines have not participated in any voluntary calls to pool patents and know-how even 
though a proposed facility to do so, C-TAP, has existed for a year. In the absence of such 
industry co-operation, mandatory solutions are needed. The TRIPS waiver offers an 
opportunity to change this.  
Pandemic management and preparedness from here on entails improving urgently 
the capacity of LMICs to produce the knowledge and inventions they need. It is morally 
problematic to invoke manufacturing capacity limitations in LMICs in order to defend a 
status quo that has served the global public very poorly in the COVID-19 pandemic. Not 
only does such a broad-brush generalisation of countries outside Europe or North 
America as merely ‘developing’ underplay excellent existing facilities in Brazil, China and 
India, for example, but it also fails to envisage a better and more equitable patent system, 
and a more effective future pandemic response than we have witnessed thus far with 
COVID-19.249 Even if some countries do not currently have the requisite technology for 
vaccine production, it is in everyone’s interest that capacity be built up and technology 
transferred as soon as possible to enable current and future production of vaccines or 





More than one year since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the rising death toll and 
emergence of variants of concern across the world have already laid bare the dire 
consequences of insufficient vaccine production and inequitable distribution between the 
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HICs and the LMICs.252 An immediate and globally co-ordinated multi-pronged approach 
to increase vaccine production and distribution capacity is urgently needed. In the absence 
of the required voluntary pharmaceutical co-operation needed to vastly increase global 
supplies to meet current demands, the TRIPS waiver proposal represents an important 
step and can operate as a legal and political lever to balance industry’s interests against 
those of the global public with the goal being to bring the pandemic to an end as soon as 
possible (and prepare for future ones). 
Although we realise that it will not, by itself, solve intractable issues caused by 
technical and material shortages, the TRIPS waiver is necessary in order to clear the way 
from IP legal constraints for companies and research institutions to develop and produce 
vaccines and other health technologies in the fight against COVID-19 without fear of 
litigation. In terms of the law, the next step is to negotiate the text-based agreement at the 
WTO. This may not go as planned. The text may end up unworkable in practice, as 
happened with the Doha Declaration in 2001 and the resulting TRIPS Amendment.253 
The recent refusal of the G20 to commit to negotiation of a text may not bode well.254 
Nonetheless, we urge all WTO members to confront the seriousness of the COVID-19 
emergency and achieve a workable text that genuinely ‘clears the way’ for radical upscaling 
of production of such vaccines and other health technologies globally, and that enables 
vaccine equity for (and production of doses in) LMICs.  
Beyond a legal text, the TRIPS waiver has become a masthead signalling a lot of 
different kinds of political-economic actions that now need to flow. We need a multi-
pronged approach: addressing the over-ordering of doses and hoarding in HICs; co-
ordinating supply chains to increase production globally; investing in C-TAP and WHO’s 
mRNA technology transfer hub; encouraging companies, even paying them if necessary, 
to enter into voluntary transfers; streamlining regulatory approval processes and sharing 
exclusive data from regulatory dossiers. All of this now needs to happen simultaneously. 
Resolving the global vaccine production and supply problem is a matter of extreme 
urgency. It is a tremendous challenge, but it is not insurmountable.  
While there are many advantages to achieving greater legal clarity on intellectual 
property rights and enabling the facilitation of technology transfer that may emerge in the 
wake of a TRIPS waiver, what is just as significant is that the waiver has provoked a global 
discussion about IP incentive systems and their limits, especially regarding – but not 
limited to – vaccines. It has shifted the terms of debate in that it places the onus on the 
pharmaceutical industry to offer greater transparency about production and pricing.255 The 
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waiver debate may also lead to improved transparency about crucial raw material and 
supply chain issues. It has redrawn the fault lines around global IP, drawing support from 
unexpected quarters – including from Nobel Prize-winning economists Paul Krugman and 
Joseph Stiglitz,256 Pope Francis,257 and the President of the United States.258 Beyond the 
time that it will take to negotiate the proposed TRIPS waiver, we urge that this positive 
momentum towards change in the political-economic structure around TRIPS must not 
be allowed to dissipate. The TRIPS waiver debate ought to trigger systematic change in 
our vaccine and health technology landscape. The broken TRIPS promise of technology 
transfer from HICs to LMICs must now be fulfilled.  
Beyond all this, the intense participation by civil society, notable figures and political 
leaders of all hues and nationalities has brought many issues into the public eye concerning 
how IP rights are granted, used and sometimes abused. Robust academic critiques of 
domestic IP regimes in wealthy countries abound, with an eye for the needs of the global 
public good – these are now getting an airing with those who understand that governance, 
capitalism and market dysfunctions cannot be separated from intellectual property law. 
This is not the time to insist on a narrow legal formalism,259 but to interpret and understand 
intellectual property law in its original broader public purpose.260 Patents are not ends in 
themselves; they are a means to an end: a public good. In the midst of a pandemic, if that 
good can be better served globally by waiving patents and other IP rights, we as a global 
community of IP scholars are compelled to support this. No one is safe until everyone is 
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